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The forest workers' cooperatives of the Pacific 
Northwest were recently considered a promising experiment 
in industrial democracy. But the movement collapsed in the 
mid-1980s. This essay will examine the emergence, success, 
and failure of this cluster of cooperatives. What was it 
in their environment or in their institutional rules that 
explains the emergence and initial successes of the forest 
workers' cooperatives? Because of the obvious lack of 
incidence of workers' cooperatives, cases of their 
spontaneous formation are of special interest. What 
.explains the failures of the reforestation cooperatives; 
changes in their environment or flaws intrinsic to the 
cooperative form of enterprise? Critics have detected 
strong degenerational .tendencies in the workers' 
cooperative form, which call into question the broader 
viability of such enterprises. Viability is of interest, 
because some liberal political theorists call for 
establishment of democracy in the economic realm, or at 
minimum a mixed market socialism composed of a 
2 
private-enterprise sector and an encouraged sector of 
workers' cooperatives. 
Overview 
Chapter II reviews the thinking of some political 
theorists favorable to democratic enterprise. John Stuart 
Mill believed that workers' cooperatives would gradually 
overtake capital-owned firms, due to superior incentives. 
Carole Pateman saw democratization of the workplace as a 
transformative means to participatory democracy in 
government and all areas of life. Amy Gutmann's 
egalitarian liberalism permits workers control of the 
workplace, but no·. say over wages or profits. Michael 
Walzer finds workplace autocracy inconsistent with 
developing democratic understandings, and believes economic 
democracy would make for a better pluralism. Robert Dahl 
foresees a third transformation of democracy, arguing that 
if democracy is justified in governing the state, it is 
also justified in governing the enterprise. Charles 
Lindblom believes that the private corporation is unsuited 
for democracy, and recommends self-management. Carol Gould 
finds a basic right to workers' self-management, following 
from the nature of liberty and equality. 
Krouse and McPherson more modestly urge a 
mixed-regime of worker-controlled and privately-owned 
3 
enterprises in a market economy. Jon Elster, from the 
nonconsequentialist value of autonomy, finds the case for 
workers' self-management to be simple and fair enough to 
mobilize popular support for endurance of the costs of 
democratic transition to such an economy. Various New Left 
theorists• also include workpl�ce democracy among their 
desiderata. 
Chapter III reviews and summarizes recent 
literature on the viability of producers' cooperatives. 
From their inception in the nineteenth century, such 
enterprises have been frequently observed to fail or 
degenerate into capitalist firms. Workers' cooperatives 
may have·an incentive advantage over conventional firms, 
but if so, why are there so few labor-controlled firms (in 
the liberal democracies)? 
First, the organizational form itself may affect 
firm survival. Recent neoclassical economic analysis 
developed by Yugoslav economists shows that a collective 
firm maximizing return to individual workers produces 
perverse economic consequences. It shows; particularly, 
that collectively-held capital inexorably leads to 
shrinkage and then transformation of the cooperative to 
individual ownership or to dissolution (degeneration), 
assuming individual objectives. The problem can be avoided 
by individual ownership of capital, which typifies 
long-lived cooperatives, but here another predicted and 
observed degenerative tendency towards the increasing 
employment of nonmembers comes into play. The solution is 
to separate entirely democratic control from capital 
ownership, while creating a structure of internal capital 
accounts which build worker investment in the enterprise. 
A recent econometric survey of European cooperatives 
supports the prediction of greater success for firms under 
individually-attributed, rather than collective, capital. 
The individually-attributed internal-capital-accounts 
variation of cooperative ownership is modelled on the 
unusually successful Mondragon complex of cooperatives in 
Basque Spain, which has shown no signs of degeneration. 
Second, what factors in the environment might 
discourage the survival of labor-controlled firms? The 
explanation of ideological hostility is-dismissed� Some 
theorists argue that an economy of workers' s cooperatives 
is thwarted by a collective action problem of one sort or 
another. A quantitative survey shows that 
worker-controlled firms in Europe from 1970 to 1983, 
although small in number, were forming and surviving at 
better rates than capitalist firms, suggesting that 
wholesale transformation is not a precondition of success. 
4 
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Third, what are the obstacles to cooperative 
formation? Analysis suggests that the cooperatives are at 
a formation disadvantage, due to lack of worker capital and 
also, perhaps, due to group size. Therefore, low capital 
barriers and preformed groups would encourage cooperative 
formation. Democratic enterprises spontaneously emerge 
only when advantages of formation exceed the rather serious 
environmental disadvantages. The larger environment 
affects firm formation, due to lack of information and the 
absence of models·. Prosperous cooperative enterprises 
occur in clusters, which suggests that particular 
production processes encourage the cooperative form, or 
that labor-controlled firms succeed by imitation, or both. 
Chapter IV explains the spontaneous emergence of 
the r�forestation workers' cooperatives in the early 1970s. 
Special attention is paid to the particular market and 
production process. The reforestation business was new 
when the cooperatives emerged. Contractors were 
notoriously unreliable in honoring wage contracts, but the 
capital barrier to business entry was trivial. Perverse 
landowner incentives in the early market rewarded dishonest 
contractors, who dominated the business. Small groups 
organized and trained under contractors had an incentive to 
reform under democratic control so as to ensure deliverance 
L 
of their pay. To avoid fraud losses, landowners gradually 
changed over to new contract incentives which happened 
initially to favor the emerging cooperatives. 
6 
The new contract incentives were also such as to 
make social supervision more efficient than exterior 
supervision. In addition, some aspects of the tree 
planting process are practically immune from affordable 
supervision of any kind. The cooperative crews also were 
able to solve the collective dilemma of team production 
through the natural sociality of small-groups, which was 
inherently more efficient (in an unconventional sense) than 
exterior supervision. These conditions accidentally 
rewarded a cultural preference for democratic enterprise. 
The largest and leading firm in this cooperative 
cluster, the Hoedad�, began as a fusion of very small 
groupings who had worked together on contractor crews, 
which, in a single leap, added existing and newly-formed 
·small groups in a federation of work teams. The harshness 
of the work and of the formative season initially selected 
for hardy members. The autonomous work crews gradually 
converged in abandoning initial share compensation for 
production-related compensation. The federation structure 
took maximum advantage of small-group cooperation. The 
cooperative combined direct democracy in work crews and 
I 
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general membership meetings with representative democracy 
in general operations, and delegation and division of labor 
for central administrative functions. Consensus 
decision-making in crews was sometimes attempted, but was 
not generally endorsed. 
Chapter V describes the rise and fall of the forest 
workers' cooperative movement. The Hoedads and similar 
smaller cooperatives thrived in the late 1970s. By 1980, 
there were a dozen cooperatives affiliated with the 
cluster's league,·the Northwest Forest Workers Association. 
The Hoedads particularly, which reached a working 
membership of 350 in 1977, became the target of a zealous 
and tenacious attack by an association of threatened 
conventional contractors. Later collapse revealed hidden 
flaws in the Hoedads' formative structure. Membership was 
instantaneous, building in an inescapable short-term bias 
to collective decisions. The Hoedads' cultural milieu was 
prone to workerist denigration of administrative and 
leadership functions, which were annually rotated. Capital 
was iridividually attributed, but refundable within one 
year, enforcing a short financial and moral time-horizon. 
The autonomous crew structure worked well for 
operations, but internal mobility led to wide quality 
differences among crews. Because of the low capital 
j 
barrier to firm formation, above-average crews tended to 
split off from Hoedads and form their own small 
cooperatives, eventually leaving Hoedads with less 
qualified members on average. At the same time, Hoedads 
was saddled with the expensive public good of cooperative 
defensei since the contractors' attacks were strategically 
aimed at them. 
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These problems were not apparent until after a 
severe and sustained collapse of the reforestation market 
began in 1980. A network of gangster operations exploiting 
illegal aliens gained a foothold in the boom years of 1978 
and 1979, and flourished under the Carter Census amnesty in 
1980. At the same time the region lapsed into a years-long 
depression because of collapse of its basic timber 
industry. Reforestation work supply fell by half, and the 
gangster network seized control of the marketplace, with 
some collusion from large forest landowners. These 
scofflaws were practically immune from law enforcement, due 
to reputation for violence among potential witnesses and 
because of informal arrangements with some officials. 
As the rule of law disappeared in the reforestation 
industry, past efforts of the contractors came to fruition 
in forcing the cooperatives to comply strictly with payroll 
laws as employees rather than as partners. This was 
accompanied by punishing technical liabilities, and heavy 
transition costs. By 1986, the Hoedads was down to 15 
members, and the other cooperatives, with one exception, 
had voluntarily dissolved. 
Second Growth cooperative, the first spinoff from 
Hoedads in 1978, was on average composed of older and more 
experienced workers than Hoedads and the other 
cooperatives. It initially imitated the informalities of 
the general cluster model, but in 1983 responded to the 
trough of the depression with a controversial 
reorganization. It established probationary membership, 
and longer capital commitment, and informally eliminated 
rotation of officers. Second Growth.has since thrived and 
is an unqualified success. 
Chapter VI concludes that the forest workers' 
cooperative movement failed, not because of any 
degenerative tendencies inherent to the cooperative form, 
but rather because of the utter collapse of their market. 
Failure to adapt collectively to radical market changes is 
ascribed to the youth of the workforce. Closing 
observations are tendered. 
9 
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CHAPTER II  
POLITICAL THEORY AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
The study of.workers' cooperatives, because they 
are so rare, would be little more than the reporting of a 
curiosity, were there not a larger ethical interest in 
propagating this form of enterprise. Utopian socialism, 
anarchism, and syndicalism have variously enthused over 
workers' control, but these traditions are themselves 
little more than intellectual curiosities. Marxism, at 
least in its Leninist materialization, is hostile to 
democracy and has lost all moral force. However, a number 
of recent theorists, most of them liberal, have seen 
promise for an economic system of self-governing 
enterprises. This chapter reviews the political theories 
of J. S. Mill, Carole Pateman, Amy Gutmann, Michael Walzer, 
Robert Dahl, Charles E. Lindblom, Carol Gould, Krouse and 
McPherson, and Jon Elster, in relation to industrial 
democracy. 
John Stuart Mill 
John Stuart Mill was most suspicious of government 
intervention in the economy, but was most favorable to "the 
11 
association of labourers among themselves" in his Political 
Economy (1965). Few new arguments have been devised since 
Mill' s brief for cooperation 140 years ago. Mill, inspired 
by the then unequivocal successes of workers' cooperatives 
in France after 1848, opposed the seizure of capital as 
advocated by some early socialists, and instead recommended 
the association of labor in democratic enterprises, 
collectively owning capital and working under elected and 
removable managers, -with cooperatives to slowly displace 
capitalist firms through natural advantage on the market. 
Mill observed that the successful cooperatives were better 
disciplined than their capitalist twins, because of the 
superior incentives of self-rule; the natural advantage of 
cooperatives is in the better alignment of material 
incentives, which carries also the large social benefits of 
of reducing industrial conflict and advancing the moral 
education of the workers. The French cooperatives he 
studied held capital in common and unrecoverable. 1 Similar 
cooperative successes were also reported in Germany, 
Switzerland and England, but Mill noticed, as well, the 
puzzle of degeneration. 2 
1An incentive incompatibility of huge importance, 
not fully understood by cooperators until the 1970s. 
2conversion to conventional ownership, likely under 
collective capital, as discussed in Chapter III below. 
The only, albeit large, advantage of cooperatives 
is better incentives; capitalists retain. the advantage of 
individual management which is always more efficient than 
collective management, said Mill. Individual capitalists 
might be better innovators, and cooperatives better 
emulators. But sooner or later, as cooperative 
associations multiplied: 
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they would tend more and more to absorb all 
work-people, except those who have too little 
understanding, or too little virtue, to be capable of 
learning to act on any other system than that of narrow 
selfishness. As this change proceeded, owners of 
capital would gradually find it to their advantage, 
instead of maintaining the struggle of the old system 
with work-people of only the worst description, to lend 
their capital to the associations . . .  and at last, 
perhaps even to exchange their capital for terminable 
annuities. (Mill 1965, 793) 
Thus, capital wou�d come to be collectively owned, and 
this, Mill concluded, assuming that both sexes participate 
equally in enterprise and government, would be "the nearest 
approach to social justice . . . possible at present to 
foresee. " 
Carole Pateman 
Pateman (1970), inspired by Rousseau, John Stuart 
Mill and guild socialist G. D. H. Cole, put participation on 
the agenda of political science with her study of 
democratic theory, and stirred general interest in workers' 
13 
self-management. She was critical of liberal democratic 
theory, such as Dahl' s polyarchy, for its alleged 
separation of the political and private spheres, its 
reliance on beneficial apathy, and its reduction of 
political participation to the occasional formal exercise 
of vote for representation. In place of rejected liberal 
democratic theory Pateman proposes her alternative 
conception of participatory democracy, which is direct 
democracy in every area of life, beginning with the 
workplace; representation would be forbidden except for 
strict delegation. The extension of "polyarchal" democracy 
to economic organizations as Dahl later advocated, would 
not fuse the political and personal, and so would be a 
hollow victory (Pateman 1975). 3 Industrial democracy is 
not the end; lower-level participation (mostly direct 
democracy) in industry is the means to an individual 
feeling of political efficacy which then allows for full 
participation at the higher-level (government). 
Pateman (1983) later observed the demise of 
participation as a popular political slogan, but applauded 
advances in empirical research and democratic theory. The 
3when formulating her attack on Dahl for failing. to 
include workers' control in his democratic theory, Pateman 
was apparently unaware of Dahl' s quiet but lifelong 
interest in the topic. 
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argument for political apathy is no longer ascendant. 
Citing Goodin and Dryzek on the rationality of 
participation, she discards the concept of political 
efficacy. What she would emphasize is not only the 
extension of political supervision over the workplace, but 
also now to the household. The patriarchal, in addition to 
the class, structures of liberal democracy must be 
challenged, she now believes. For Paternan, industrial 
democracy was of primary value not for its own sake but as 
an educative project. Moreover, what most people take for 
democracy she declares illusory; anything other than 
direct, universal and constant participation does not 
count. The omnipresence of supervision in her vision, and 
the striking absence of trust, leads to an unintended 
totalitarianism; in her world one is hounded from block 
committee to work committee to commune assembly with never 
a moment of individual peace. 
Arny Gutmann 
Amy Gutmann (1980) calls for democratizing economic 
relations in her construction of egalitarian liberalism. 
She starts with traditional liberalism' s  concern for 
individual interests, especially, of course, the liberty 
interest. State limitation on ownership and use of private 
15 
property is justified by the need to equalize all 
individuals' shares of freedom. Freedom begins in freedom 
from want, she continues, so goods must be more equally 
redistributed among persons, so as to expand the realm of 
individual choice. The argument is convincing, she says, 
only to convinced egalitarians, and depends upon "empirical 
assessments concerning the economy and individual 
psychology" (Gutmann 1980, 12). Gutmann revises Rawls' 
principles of distributive justice so that, first, broad 
welfare rights in primary goods are imported into his 
equal-liberty principle, and second, so that the residual 
goods ("money") remaining for his difference principle are 
distributed as equally as possible; she rejects the 
prospect of egalitarian collapse. The goal is not 
maintenance of any minimum standard, but thorough equality 
of goods. 
Liberal egalitarianism requires comprehensive 
redistribution of goods, but also maximum participation; 
however these two aims are in tension if and when 
democratic rule rejects egalitarian justice. The solution, 
writes Gutmann, is that "we" make welfare a constitutional 
I 
right; participation "will be encouraged [only] a� far as 
is consistent with a just distribution" (Gutmann 1980, 177, 




principles to conventional constitutional rights, the 
national legislature will ensure that ''incomes are 
equitably distributed across the nation"; local communities 
will contain "democratic political forums" which will 
forward information to the higher authorities, but may 
decide on such matters as the optional portion of the local 
school curriculum'(200-202). one could not give up more 
goods for more choices. 
Gutmann agrees on "the value of industrial 
democracy for self-dignity and development, " but rejects 
the notion of justice as "the actual will of the citizens" 
(206). She declares: 
Workers' control in a fully egalitarian society will be 
limited to issues unrelated to wage- and profit-scale 
negotiations, for these issues must be equitably 
resolved on an industry-wide or national scale . . . .  
Yet full decision-making power will be granted to 
workers on many nonwage, nonprofit issues--particularly 
issues relating to job structure . . . .  where the job 
structure preferences of workers are completely 
unacceptable to owners because of potential profit 
losses, a neutral government board, or the judiciary, 
might arbitrate the case . . .  (206) 
Gutmann' s industrial democracy apparently preserves 
a group of owners, but they are forbidden control over 
profit, wages and the workplace. Ownership remains in name 
only; all the social disadvantages of property are 
collected in the central state, while its several 
advantages are denied to all smaller institutions. The 
17 
workers are "granted" the workplace. There is nothing left 
for owners to do, workers have say over everything except 
pay and profit, which are calculated by a national 
government. The scheme contradicts, without confronting, 
familiar empirical assessments of psychology and economics 
(and also fails to satisfy ordinary definitions of 
industrial democracy). In short, why work? Workers have 
control of the workplace, but, whatever they do or decide, 
they have no control over their reward. If the work-team 
votes to work half as hard or twice as smart, they get the 
same pay, because everyone in the country does. If one 
worker shirks, the work-team may not reduce his pay (except. 
by judicial action, and even then, what about the shirker' s 
right to respect?). So, by the egalitarian fiat of their 
moral superiors democratic workers are denied resort to a 
common egalitarian principle: equal pay for equal effort. 
If one work team keeps an unusually clean and pleasant 
shop, must the national legislature forbid the inequality, 
or extend it as a right throughout the land? True, 
cooperatives do tend to be more egalitarian than equivalent 
capitalist firms, but that comes from working shoulder to 
shoulder, not from clever Supreme Court briefs. Workers 
would have less autonomy in Gutmann' s America than they do 
in the imperfect present. The boss is replaced by the 




Walzer (1983) disdains philosophical justice and 
appeal to personal rights in favor of a "radically 
particularist" account of our "shared understandings" 
(xiv). Literal egalitarianism is repressive and false, he 
begins. Instead: 
The aim of political egalitarianism is a society free 
from domination. This is the lively hope named by the 
word equality: no more bowing and scraping, fawning 
and toadying; no more fearful trembling; no more 
high-and-mightiness; no more masters, no more slaves. 
It is not a hope for the elimination of differences; we 
don' t all have to be the same or have the same amount 
of things. (Walzer 1983, xiii) 
For Walzer there are a number of contextually given social 
goods (or sets of goods), each constituting a relatively 
autonomous sphere of distributive justice i for example, 
money should not buy church office and piety should not 
make for market advantage. Trouble comes when one good or 
set of goods "becomes dominant and determinative of value 
in all the spheres of distribution" (10), and comes double 
as such dominance is inevitably monopolized. Resistance to 
the monopoly arises, demanding more equal redistribution of 
the the dominant good (simple equality); or, best, opening 
the way for autonomous distribution of all social goods 
- ---- - I 
(complex equality); or, demanding a new dominant good 
monopolized by a new group (revolution). 
19 
Simple equality challenges the monopoly over but 
not the dominance of a social good, to no end. To 
illustrate, redistribution of money (possible only through 
a centralized and activist state) would neutralize its 
dominance, but then those of talent would arise to seek the 
dominance of educated merit. Then, simple equality would 
call on the state to regulate skill, and soon enough those 
arise who would monopolize dominant political power. 
Political power might be limited through wide distribution, 
as in democracy, but again, breaking the monopoly over the 
good of political power neutralizes its dominance, thus 
breaking its efficacy in enforcing money equality. Complex 
equality seeks to narrow the range of convertibility among 
spheres, so that wealth does not command political power, 
political power does not command the market, nor the market 
command grace, nor grace wealth, and so on. Free exchange, 
desert, and need, for example, each have their place as 
distributive principles, in different spheres, and always 
depending on the particular political community. 
Plutocracy is clearly superior to totalitarianism, 
but the sphere of property and the sphere of power are 
better separated, on Walzer's account. "Ownership [of the 
enterprise] constitutes a ' private government, ' and the 
workers are its subjects" (293). Feudalism was private 
government, and separation of property from polity a long 
struggle, ending in a redefinition of ownership which 
excluded taxation, adjudication, and conscription, now 
socialized in the political community as a whole. The 
modern firm is distinguished in that workers voluntarily 
enter its doors, and is justified by the enterprise, 
energy, and risk-assumption of its owners. But the same 
can be said for cities and towns (and sometimes for 
democratic states). But no one owns the town. 
20 
To illustrate, Walzer tells the story of Pullman, 
Illinois, a company and a town owned by one man, George 
Pullman. Pullman had built the town from the ground up, 
and owned every machine and curtain in it. There was no 
municipal government; Pullman ruled the town as he did the 
firm, with benevolent autocracy. Residents were always 
free to leave. While subordination was harsher in the 
workplace than in the town, contemporary opinion condemned 
Pullman' s town, but not his factory, as contrary to the 
American spirit. But, Walzer asks, how are rule in town 
and factory distinguished? Not by enterprise and risk. 
Not by capital investment, as owners of municipal bonds do 




leave does not justify autocratic municipal rule. Where 
the town taxes, the firm fines; where the town punishes, 
the firm fires. There is no deep difference,. and so 
democratic distributions of political power "can' t stop at 
the factory gates" (298). 
Cooperatives should run their own affairs, subject 
only to general regulation such as to assign negative 
externalities (293); they should even be free to choose 
their own coworkers however they please, other than on 
racial criteria (162). As for wage differentials, although 
cooperatives tend to be egalitarian, compensation would be 
different between firms according to the market, and firms 
should be free to make their best democratic decisions on 
internal distributions, and this is to the good (117-118). 
Finally, future democratization of the firm would resemble 
the diverse experiments and arrangements of government 
democracies, and should not be confined to any single 
design (302). 
Dahl and Lindblom 
Democratic theorist Robert Dahl began his 
dissertation a few.weeks after the signing of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and was awarded his doctorate 
between Dunkirk and the fall of France. His theme was the 
�-
2 2  
compatibility of socialism with liberal democracy, best 
attained through some kind of market socialism rather than 
authoritarian planning, and by workers' control of industry 
in preference to central state control (Dahl 1985a). 
Setting aside fifty intervening years of communist terror, 
fellow-travelling apologia, and radical demonization of 
Dahl, the essay would be at home in almost any socialist 
journal today. 
Dahl begins his Preface to Economic Democracy 
(1985b) with the observation that Tocqueville' s fear that 
democratic equality would destroy liberty has not been 
borne out (although the conditions which protect liberty 
against equality must be identified and retained). The 
larger problem now, following from the change from agrarian 
democratic republicanism to corporate capitalism, is the 
threat of a certain economic liberty to democracy, 
specifically, the ownership and control of firms as a 
source of political inequality, both through unequally 
. large·. corporate power in the governance of the state and in 
the complete absence of democracy in governance of the 
firm. 
The right to private ownership and control of the 
firm is defended in two ways, instrumentally, as socially 
beneficial, and morally, as a natural right, says Dahl. A 
23 
purely instrumental defense would mean that private control 
of the firm is subordinate to the fundamental and 
inalienable right of self-government. A rights defense of 
such property would have to encounter democratic rights. 
Property rights and democratic rights each may be portrayed 
as a danger to the other. The classipal republican 
solution to the antagonism is rough equality in property, a 
self-regulating egalitarian order (imperfectly) realized in 
the early American republic through the accident of cheap 
land, but since replaced by an inegalitarian corporate 
capitalism which has usurped the legitimacy of the earlier 
order. Dahl finds a right to economic liberty, but holds 
that entitlement, labor, and liberty defenses of property 
fail in establishing any derivative right to private 
ownership of corporate enterprises. 
Dahl invites us to imagine a new economic order 
which would generate a distribution of political resources 
favorable to democracy, be fair or just, preferably be 
efficient, encourage popular virtue, and, finally, allow 
for personal economic freedom. Given such values, 
corporate capitalism and bureaucratic socialism are out. 
Workers' cooperatives, or Dahl' s preferred term, 
"self-governing firms, 11 are in.. Dahl declares that 
Pateman' s argument for the transformative promise of 
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industrial democracy is empirically unsupported. A system 
of self-governing enterprises would not mean utopian 
regeneration of humankind, but would reduce conflict, 
improve political equality and democracy in the state, and 
develop stronger standards of fairness. 
Dahl then moves from the instrumental defense of 
industrial democracy to a stronger justification, and 
addresses three objections: 
If democracy is justified in governing the state, then 
it must also be justified in governing economic 
enterprises; and to say that it is not justified in 
governing economic enterprises is to imply that it is 
not justified in governing the state. (111) 
The first objection is violation of a superior right to 
property. Dahl already rejects a strong property right in 
the abstract, but concretely would not expropriate capital 
in any transition. Capital hiring labor would be replaced 
by labor hiring capital. 
The second objection is that decisions in the firm 
are not binding in the same sense as they are binding in 
·the state. The state is backed by coercion, but the worker 
in the firm voluntarily exchanges subjection for pay. The 
government of the firm makes decisions directing its 
subjects, backed by enforcement and the ultimate sanction 
of firing; but the worker is free to leave. The argument 
that any decision of national government is justified by 
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its citizens' freedom to leave is generally rejected; 
because exit .is so costly, membership is practically 
compulsory. Dahl says that the case more similar to the 
firm, decisions of local government, are also rarely 
justified by the freedom to leave; moreover, unlike 
applying for employment in the firm, one need not petition 
for citizenship in one' s new municipality. 
The third objection is that, unlike democratic 
government, members of the firm lack sufficiently equal 
qualifications to decide which matters should be subject to 
binding collective decision and which should be delegated 
to recoverable authority; guardianship is better than 
democracy in economic enterprise. In response, Dahl 
distinguishes between ends and means in the firm. 
Conceding it as an empirical question, Dahl asserts that 
"it is not inconceivable" (128) that a system of of 
self-governed enterprises could further the social ends of 
savings, investment, growth, and employment. Moreover, 
such firms would enjoy the means of hiring or developing 
managerial skill, and the means of efficiency, as 
demonstrated by successful cooperatives such as the 
Mondragon complex. The "iron law" of oligarchy does 
operate, but so does an opposing tendency toward autonomy 
and mutual control. 
In closing, Dahl believes that an economy of 
self-governing enterprises would discover pragmatic, but 
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more egalitarian, tradeoffs between equity and efficiency. 
He reviews the merits and demerits of individual, 
collective, state, and "cooperative" own�rship of 
self-governed enterprises, and concludes in favor of 
"cooperative" ownership. 4 For transition, Dahl recommends 
that a few typical firms in several industries be converted 
to self-governance, and if successful, then perhaps 
self--governance could expand through wage-earner funds on 
the model of the Meidner plan of Swedish;social democracy. 
Finally, in his latest book, Dahl (1989) envisions 
a third transformation of democracy, rejecting nationally 
regulated equality as impractical and probably oppressive, 
for democratization of the economic order. Democracy' s 
first transformation was to the democratic city-state in 
classical antiquity. The second democratic transformation 
was from the city-state to the pluralist nation-state in 
the modern era. A third transformation would achieve 
democratic governance within the firm, an idea as "foolish 
and unrealistic, " Dahl claims, as the idea of extending 
democracy to the nation-state. Democratically run firms 
4The Mondragon structure of internal capital 
accounts, described by Ellerman ( 1984, · 1986) , and described 
below. 
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need not be economically superior, he remarks, but only as 
good as conventional firms. Democracy then would tip the 
scales. 
Lindblom (1977) explores the links between politics 
and markets. All polyarchal (liberal democratic) political 
systems rely on market-oriented (and private-enterprise) 
economic systems. Why? The connection originates in their 
common birth in constitutional liberalism, but is not a 
necessary connection according to Lindblom. Their 
continuing association is explained by the privileged 
position of business in existing polyarchy, in that the 
business executive serves as a public official in the 
market system. Popular control of enterprise is limited 
largely by consumer choice, since business serves 
indispensable public functions and so requires both 
extraordinary inducements and deference from the state, to 
the point that, while libertarian, existing polyarchies 
"are controlled undemocratically by business and property" 
(170-178, 169). Lindblom more or less recommends 
industrial democracy, market socialism and self-management, 
as the best future for democracy. His work concludes: 
It has been a curious feature of democratic thought 
that it has not faced. up to the private corporation as 
a peculiar organization in an ostensible 
democracy . • . .  The large private corporation fits 
oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it 
does not fit. (356) 
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carol Gould 
Gould (1988) presents a thorough normative theory 
of democracy and workers' self-management. She argues that 
individual liberty (liberalism) and social cooperation and 
social equality (socialism) are compatible rather than 
conflicting values, and that democratic participation is 
required as much in the economy as in politics. For Gould, 
individual freedom is not only the capacity for free 
choice, but also an activity of self-development. This 
entails individual equality, and social cooperation as a 
necessary condition of individual self-development. 
Individual equality extends to equal rights to conditions 
of self-development, including enabling minimal material 
conditions, civil liberties, political rights, and the 
right to participate in areas of joint decision-making. 
Increased state power or centralized authority is ruled out 
as a means, since that would inhibit individual rights to 
self-determination and participation. 
Gould observes that theories of economic justice 
typically concentrate on distribution, not production. For 
Rawls, the equal-liberty principle applies to the political 
domain, but in the economic domain justice is concerned 
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only with the distribution of social and economic 
advantages. Gould says that equal liberty requires 
workplace democracy as well. Moreover, the goods that 
Rawls would distribute are produced by people, who are 
entitled to them. This is not a full endorsement of 
Nozick, of course, whom she says fails to appreciate the 
fact of joint or social labor and appropriation. Contrary 
to Nozick, the exchange between capital and labor in the 
conventional firm is not fully voluntary, but constrained 
by the worker' s practical lack of choice. 
Given equal rights to self-development, Gould would 
include rights and powers to participate in decisions 
involving joint production, and permit distributional 
inequalities, as desert, above minimal subsistence, health, 
and education standards. Such democracy would normally be 
located in the firm, its citizens the worker-members, who 
would have the right to decide jointly on all aspects of 
operation including wages and investment, in direct or 
representative democracy as need be. A market, to the 
extent it permits free agreement among democratic firms, is 
compatible with economic democracy. The democratic state 
may regulate abuses of the market system. 
Where others justify workers' self-management as a 
means to meaningful work, property right, productive 
efficiency, or democracy, Gould says she justifies 
self-management as a principle of justice, from the equal 
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right to the conditions of self-development. Dahl, for 
instance, argues that economic democracy follows on simple 
analogy from political democracy; but the negative freedom 
and abstract equality adduced in his support of political 
democracy could just. as well support the private-enterprise 
form of economic decision-making, Gould claims. But is it 
wise to remake society on justice alone? 
Krouse and McPherson 
Krouse and McPherson in Ethics (1986) call for a 
mixed regime of worker-controlled (worker-owned or 
socially-owned) and privately-owned enterprises in a market 
economy, allowing workers to choose the work relationships 
they prefer. The admirable modesty of their argument can 
be captured in summary, but not the many nuances. such a 
regime, they say, is not inspired by grand moral 
foundations, but ·is attentive to the values of liberty, 
equality, efficiency. Tq the libertarian contention that 
the choice is already available, they respond,that initial 
inequality in property, precludes the establishment of a 
worker-controlled sector, which should be encouraged by 
government intervention. To attain equality, they resort 
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to Meade' s obscure scheme of a "property-owning democracy" 
with strict inheritance laws, reward of small savings, and 
strong educational opportunity. With egalitarian 
background conditions, the establishment of a cooperative 
sector still might be impeded by collective-action problems 
or by positive externalities. Some theorists, along the 
·lines of Walzer (and Dahl), assert an inalienable right to 
democratic control of the firm. The dark side of such an 
inalienable right would be the denial of freedom to enter 
into contracts of wage labor, and this liberty objection 
cannot simply be dismissed, given, among other problems, 
the empirical link between polyarchy and private-enterprise 
market systems. 
Could an egalitarian mixed regime be sustained? 
This is the question of viability. Equality could decay 
through the privately-owned sector or from market dynamics. 
The mix of firms could be unstable, either through economic 
or political aggression on the part of either the 
privately-owned sector or the cooperative sector. Krouse 
and McPherson respond·that stability could be maintained 
through relatively mild government intervention, involving 
less interference than the alternative of the capitalist 
welfare state. Sustainability ultimately depends on 
widespread moral support. The rest of the case defends 
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retention of a privately-owned sector. The proposal is 
more than a compromise, they say, in actually respecting 
the values of personal autonomy and political liberty, 
noncoercion and free choice. Transition is problematic, 
but is at least as feasible as the more ambitious socialist 
proposals. 
Arneson (1986) criticizes property-owning democracy 
as beyond tolerable efficiency costs and as too much of a 
concentration of state power, and criticizes a mixed regime 
as an overly costly manufacture of options given the 
liberal safety of decentralized market socialism. Elster 
(1986) agrees with Dahl in rejecting state ownership of 
enterprises as undermining. of workers' control, and so is 
critical of Krouse and McPherson' s retention of that 
option. Also, Elster finds Meade' s property-owning 
democracy both unenforceable and undesirable. He adds to 
the analysis of a mixed property regime. An alternative 
neglected by Krouse and McPherson is a mix at the 
firm-level; first, in that a gradual transition could 
rebundle rights so that capital initially retains voice in 
the firm; second, as observed of some existing 
cooperatives, members can employ nonmembers. Next, . Elster 
defines the central issue as whether a mixed regime would 
be a "stable polymorphism. " The paucity of cooperatives 
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could follow because their present frequency is below some 
stability threshold ; or there are only two equilibria, pure 
capitalism or pure market socialism ; or pure capitalism is 
the Pareto inferior equilibrium ; or pure capitalism is 
uniquely optimal. Assuming that the last is not the case, 
inertia could be explained by myopia, externalities, risk 
aversion, and adaptive--preference formation. 
Jon Elster 
Elster (1988) favors a constitutional democratic 
transition to socialism, supported by arguments from 
consequence and from justice. The /consequentialist 
argument is more an argument for skepticism: social 
science is a long way from predicting "the global net 
long-term equilibrium effects of .major institutional 
changes, " while piecemeal social engineering is little 
remedy since it permits estimate of only "local, partial, 
short-term or transitional effects" (309). For example, 
the mixed record of individual workers' cooperatives in a 
capitalist economy (local} tells little about large�scale 
market socialism (global} .  
Next, knowledge of partial effects from the . ceteris 
paribus approach of the social sciences does not permit 
estimation of net effects from the many changes attendant 
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on a major reform. Also, the static advantages of, say, an 
economic system, must be compared to its dynamic 
advantages. Finally, the equilibrium of large reform 
cannot be predicted from the phenomena of transition. 
Piecemeal social change can not detect institutions viable 
only in the large and the long-term, but peOple 
understandably have no motivation to "participate in 
massive and protracted experiments of uncertain efficacy, 
unless the reform is perceived to be inherently fair and 
just" (316). 
Elster ' s  argument from negative justice applies to 
smaller reforms also justified on consequentialist grounds. 
Given the abundance of reform proposals, "the very 
plurality of cooperative arrangments prevents any one of 
them being chosen, " a bargaining problem (317). 
Schelling ' s  theory of bargaining observes that agreement 
sometimes hits upon a naturally salient outcome, a focal 
point, such as "divide equally, " or "do nothing. " So, 
democratic politics arrives at focal policies, which should 
show at least the appearance of simplicity, efficiency, and 
fairness. 
The argument from positive justice applies to 
larger reforms: 
It is my contention that the nonconsequentialist values 
of justice, liberty and democracy have been the major 
-�-
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proximate causes of social change over the last few 
centuries . . . .  If a reform is perceived as 
fundamentally just, people will be motivated to endure 
the costs of transition and the extensive 
trial-and-error procedures that may be required before 
a viable implementation is found . (319-320) 
Universal suffrage was won on justice, not on calculation 
of consequences, which were dreaded, says Elster . A major 
reform such as Weitzman' s profit-sharing makes no appeal to 
justice, and thus there would be no motivation to endure 
transition: 
By contrast, the case for workers' self-management 
rests on the intuitively appealing idea that any joint 
or cooperative enterprise ought to be governed in 
common, by the equal influence of all concerned and to 
the equal benefit of all concerned. Because the 
proposal rests on the nonconsequentialist value of 
autonomy, it is more resistant to practical 
difficulties of implementation . (320-321) 
There is a certain irony in Elster' s emphasis on · the 
instrumental value of justice . in winning change . 
Elster artd Moene (1989) provide a more particular 
analysis . The most general problem is economizing on 
information and trust ; if both were unlimited central 
planning would work . Information is limited in principle, 
but a higher level of trust is possible, although trust, 
solidarity and altruism would be the byproducts of a good 
economic system, not its preconditions . A capitalist wage 
system relies on unemployment to discipline shirking, the 
firm' s internal efficiency thus resting on external 
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inefficiency. Neith�r capitalism nor central planning can 
satisfy "producers' preferences" for participation, 
although capitalism probably offers greater scope for 
self-realization. Preferences should be respected when 
there is genuine freedom of choice. A little central 
planning is an impossible choice for workers under 
capitalism, while the choice of decentralized market 
socialism is confronted by problems of transition and 
stability. 
If there are externalities, then change from an 
inferior stable system to a superior stable system 
justifies state intervention, usually undesirable because 
costly to maintain and detracting from individual autonomy. 
If different workers prefer different systems, the question 
is that much more complex. Further, Elster and Moene, 
without detail, say they are skeptical of arguments by 
Dahl, Krouse and McPherson, Pateman, and Milton Friedman, 
asserting close logical and sociological connections 
between the political and economic realms. 
Isolated cooperatives face negative discrimination, 
and adverse self-selection of members: only rebels go 
against the current. There could be positive 
self-selection too, as in the Pacific Northwest forest 
workers' cooperatives. However, Elster' s impression that 
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the forest workers' cooperatives depend on idealistic wage 
and time sacrifice is wrong. In fact, pay and conditions 
are usually better than in their capitalist counterparts. 
Those cooperatives do tend to select their members 
(workers) with care, but that is true of all economic 
enterprises, throwing some confusion over Elster' s 
local-global distinction. In both the pure capitalist or 
pure cooperative economies firms would compete in selecting 
their workers, but all is not equal, the differing criteria 
of worker selection (say, diligent subordination as 
compared to diligent cooperation) shape the cultural 
qualities of the labor pool even when it is the whole 
population. In addition, various alleged externalities are 
evaluated. 
Economic theory is presently unable to offer strong 
conclusions on the large-scale and long-term viability of 
cooperatives, Elster and Moene continue. Comparisons are 
still overly stylized, although economic theory does begin 
to indicate the merits of choices within a larger system of 
rights and institutions. For example, there is progress in 
analyzing problems of ownership choice for workers' 
cooperatives. 5 Here is their description of market 
socialism: 
5Presented in the following chapter of this essay. 
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Our concept . . .  is that of a. system of labour 
cooperatives. The system, however, need not cover all 
economic activities . •. . .  Some productive and 
regulatory activities would have to be carried out by 
the state, as they a�e in all contemporary capitalist 
economies. More controversially, there could be room 
for traditional capitalist enterprises alongside the 
cooperative ones. Market socialism could even be 
compatible with the cooperatives being in the minority, 
if they interacted to form a substantial cooperative 
bloc in the economy. : ( 2 6) 
A mixed system furthers ��onomic freedom, and allows for 
the fact that "not all production processes - lend themselves 
easily to the workers' monitoring of one another that may 
be a condition for a viable cooperative" (27) . 
. Other Theorists 
A number of writers have repackaged the demand 
lists of the New Left in the more winsome wrappings of 
Democracy; these works deal informally, or peripherally, 
with workplace - democracy. Perhaps ' as with Pascal' s wager, 
or the goal of the common good in deliberation, sooner or 
later one will end up believing in what one says. Carney 
and Shearer (1980) founded this genre in their manifesto 
for Tom Hayden' s ("the American Lenin") electoral campaign 
organization. Tacked on to support for sweeping 
nationalizations, guaranteed incomes, solar energy, illegal 
immigration, and nonintervention in Soviet proxy wars is 
the call for a democratic workplace as already won in 
places like China and Cuba. Their program was 
social-democratic in form, but popular-front in essence. 6 
Dolbeare (1986) recommends a New Left-inspired state 
socialism as "economic democracy, " with nary a mention of 
self-governing firms. 
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As the decade has passed, and now as it ends with 
all of communism in disgrace, democracy and liberalism have 
supplanted hard utopianism in left theory. 7 Cohen and 
Rogers (1983) present an interesting democratic program, 
including workplace democracy, based on a "principle of 
democratic legitimacy. " The program is prefaced by an 
extended portrait of a ugly and brutal America on the eve 
of destruction. Cohen more formally presents the ideal of 
deliberative democracy elsewhere (1989); the conventional 
business firm, of course, would fail the deliberation 
test. 8 Barber' s (1984) call for strong democracy includes 
public support of experiments in workplace democracy among 
6The comments are a self-criticism. 
7In practice, the American Left still refuses to 
confront the moral and political necessity of trading in 
its obsessive anti-Americanism for · obsessive anti­
communism, and thus is destined for continued public 
disdain. 
8other than passing suggestions, I failed to find 
appl ication of the ideal of deliberative democracy to the 
problem of the business firm; it would be an interesting 
analysis. Gould (1988) claims that Habermas rejects self­
management in the economy. 
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its twelve points, but that point of his program is barely 
developed. Cohen and Rogers, and Barber, argue that their 
programs need to be enacted as a whole, and naturally they 
reject nondemocratic means. Bowles and Gintis (1986) argue 
for a postliberal democracy, where extended personal rights 
displace property rights, achieved through a democratic 
dynamic including workplace democracy, economic planning, 
and state control of capital. 
CHAPTER III  
THE VIABILITY OF PRODUCERS' COOPERATIVES 
Promise and Degeneration in 
Producers' Cooperatives 
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Initial enthusiasm for workers' cooperatives can be 
found among the utopian socialists , in the founding of 
German social democracy under Lassalle ( Kolakowski 1981 , 
242) , in the faint beginnings of English socialism with 
J. S. Mill (1965) , and among the Knights of Labor of the 
American 1880s. Marx , while full of praise , believed that 
cooperatives were bound to degenerate in the capitalist 
environment. By the end of the nineteenth century commonly 
observed degeneration of cooperative enterprises led the 
emerging labor movement to abandon cooperation for trade 
unionism , state socialism , or , later , Bolshevism. Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb influentially opposed producer 
cooperation , declaring , "All such assocations of producers 
that start as alternatives to the capitalist system either 
fail or cease to be democracies of producers" ( Russell 
1985b , 28). 
Blumberg (1968), 1 a pioneer of the modern wave of 
enthusiasm for industrial democracy, noted the following 
tendencies to degeneration: 
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Transforming the cooperative into a simple 
profit-making, profit-seeking business, 
indistinguishable from private enterprise . . .  ; 
closing off of cooperative membership ; raising the cost 
of of membership to a prohibitively high level ; and 
resorting to the anti-cooperative device of taking on 
hired labor. 
such phenomena deserve careful study. Particularly as, in 
recent years, the labor-controlled sector in market 
economies has attained its largest absolute and relative 
size. In the U. S. that sector includes a few thousand 
firms serving about 100, 000 members, up from next to zero 
in the 1950s, exemplars being the plywood cooperatives and 
(until 1985) the reforestation cooperatives of the Pacific 
Northwest. In the European Economic Community, there were 
some 14, 000 firms serving a half million members in 1981, 
the exemplars being the Mondragon . complex of Basque Spain, 
as well as developing sectors in France and Italy. The 
kibbutz movement in Israel, and to a lesser extent the 
Histradut (trade-union) firms, are another notable example. 
Finally, the Yugoslav experiment in self-management is of 
some interest, although marred by initial underdevelopment 
and political dictatorship (Ben-Ner 1988a). 
1Quoted in Russell (1985, 29). 
4 3  
.Abell (1982) characterizes the supposed comparative 
advantage of producer cooperatives, 2 assuming 
self-interest, as superior incentives, making for increased 
productivity from greater expenditure of member effort, 
more appropriate direction of effort, and more effective 
utilization of capital. In addition, appealing to Sen, 
Abell aptly remarks that producer cooperatives "encourage 
altruistic behavior without necessarily relying on it . .  
They are, thus, prudently ' idealistic' " (76). To the 
extent that work product is not attributable to individual 
effort, he continues, the democratic work team faces a 
collective dilemma. Can the cooperative enterprise better 
foster and capture the benefits of partial altruism? The 
comparative question becomes, how best escape suboptimal 
outcomes, through democratic coordination and distribution, 
or through autocratic coordination and distribution? 
A different characterization of comparative 
advantage is - offered by Ben-Ner (1988b). The democratic 
firm. is free to choose its style of governance from a broad 
range of possibilities, including hierarchical management, 
participatory management, or direct worker self-management; 
while the capitalist firm is precluded from choosing any 
2Abell' s paper does not neglect supposed 
disadvantages. 
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form which impinges on owners ' rights of control . Thus, in 
the abstract, the worker-controlled firm can match any 
governance efficiencies chosen by the capital-controlled 
firm, while the capital-controlled firm can not match some 
governance efficiencies chosen by the worker�controlled 
firm . In the capitalist firm, owners and workers have some 
conspicuously different interests . What is optimal for one 
party may be suboptimal for the other and for the whole 
firm . For example, workers may be averse to 
performance-related compensation, while owners may stint on 
firm-specific capital if union wage demands can exploit 
sunk investments . Workers and owners may exploit each 
other ' s  firm-specific assets . Ben-Ner claims that these 
conflicts of interests can be internalized in the 
worker-controlled firm . 
Another possible advantage in the worker-controlled 
firm is cheaper supervision and better reward to effort : 
Monitoring by specialized supervisors is partly 
replaced and supplemented by mutual monitoring by 
co-workers who, as a by-product of their·, presence at 
the workplace, observe each other's performance, and 
have incentives to share their observations with 
management as well as enforce performance standards on 
fellow workers . This effect is strengthened by 
enhanced motivation to work due to sharing of profits . 
(Ben-Ner 1988b, 2 93-2 9 4) 
Alchian and Demsetz ( 1972) and Jensen and Meckling ( 1979) 
argue the contrary, that the worker's diluted share of 
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profit makes for little incentive to supervise as compared 
to the residual claimant. A final major advantage may be 
freer flow of information in the democratic enterprise. 
Organizational Form and Firm Survival 
Why are there so few labor-controlled firms? That 
is the major question for economic democracy. Lack of 
incidence could be explained by low rates of birth (in 
comparison to capital-controlled firms) or by low rates of 
survival (again, in comparison to capital-controlled 
firms). Rates of birth or survival, in turn, could be 
explained by the workings of the organizational form or by 
the workings of the larger environment. Lack of incidence 
is a powerful argument against any supposed economic 
advantages of such firms, and any argument of ethical 
superiority is surely influenced by the question of 
viability. First, consider the relationship of 
organizational form to firm survival . A labor-controlled 
firm can survive, die, or metamorphose into a 
capital-controlled firm (degeneration). 
Theoretical analysis of worker-management only 
began to gain sophistication in the 1970s. Neoclassical 
economics reduces the capitalist firm to a production 
function which acts to maximize profit; from this and a few 
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other assumptions the elegant deductions of microeconomics 
follow. That capitalist production function is: 
(1) capitalist managers: max rr = pq - (wL + �px + k) 
where rr = profit, q = output, p = its price, w = wage rate, 
L = number of workers employed, p = price of various 
inputs, x = input, k =fixed costs, and y = income per 
worker. 3 Ward (1958) fathered the theory of the Illyrian4 
firm, which explores formal variations of price theory 
following from the alternative assumption that the the 
Illyrian firm acts to to maximize income per worker: 
( 2 ) worker-managers: max y = 
pq - p::p . x .  + k) 
l. l. 
L 
With the conventional capitalist production function "the 
first-order conditions for a maximum generate the familiar 
marginal equalities" (Horvat 1987, 358), that is, the value 
of the marginal product equals the price of the relevant 
factor, and when factor prices rise output and employment 
fall, when output prices rise output and employment rise 
too. 
3The discussion here closely follows Horvat (1985a, 
1985b) 
4ward (1958) was prompted by early reports of 
Yugoslav self-management. Illyria was the Roman name for 
parts of modern Yugoslavia. 
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However, the Illyrian production function leads to 
perverse consequences. The primary finding is a perverse 
supply response, that is, in the short-run single-product 
firm an increase in price causes the firm to contract 
supply while a decrease in price causes it to expand 
supply. Related findings are: (a) Illyrian firms would be 
smaller than their capitalist twins in the short run when 
profits are positive, (b) labor, and in the short run 
output, increases (decreases) when fixed cost increases 
(decreases), (c) in an economy of Illyrian firms, workers 
are not efficiently allocated among firms, and (d) because 
capital is collectively or socially owned5 under the 
Illyrian assumptions, workers have no incentive to invest 
in the firm, thus, there would be a tendency to underinvest 
and to distribute all income as wages. 
Mygind (1986) emphasizes that "the combination of 
collective ownership and individual objectives is the 
fundamental assumption in the Illyrian model." Formal 
economic theory has subjected the simple Illyrian model to 
numerous modifications, such as more complex technology, no 
perfect competition, uncertainty, variable effort, 
compensation discrimination by seniority, and external 
5Yugoslavian firms, formally controlled by their 
workers, are not owned by them, but by "society. " 
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finance, the upshot summarized by Mygind as "the more 
realistic the assumptions are, the more efficient the 
self-managed firm will be compared to its capitalist twin" 
(7 4) • 
Vanek (1977), the leading Yugoslav economist of 
self-management, shows that collective capital is the 
mortal flaw of labor�controlled firms, and thus explains 
observations of their degeneration and demise. If firm 
assets are held in a collective and nonrecoverable form (as 
has been commonly the case, for firms established by 
benevolent patrons, or in boot-strap firms by naive or 
ideological choice), 6 then four forces of self-extinction 
come into play. Assume a technology with constant returns 
to scale. The first force of self-extinction is that 
income per worker can be increased by reducing the labor 
force, because of diminishing returns to labor. That is, 
the fewer members the more each member receives in return 
on collective capital, ( if expulsions are implausible, then 
attrition produces· the effect). The second force of 
self-extinction follows from the first: capital is 
disinvested or consumed in order to re-establish the 
6Beginning with the pioneer Rochdale cooperative 
movement in mid-nineteenth century England, to today, 
"limited return to capital" is enunciated as one of the 
fundamental principles of cooperation. 
optimal capital-labor ratio; thus capital and labor are 
successively reduced until the collective disappears. 
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A third, "underinvestment" force of 
self-extinction, follows from nonrecoverable funding with 
no rental payment to capital: the marginal productivity of 
capital is always above the member' s time preference; that 
is, with nonrecoverable principal, and with benefit only 
from increasing income as a worker, return must be 
extraordinary for the worker to choose firm investment. 
For example, given a rate of time preference of 6 percent, 
then an investment return of 7. 2 percent would be required 
by the worker committed to the firm for 30 years, and 54. 5 
percent for the worker committed to the firm for two years 
(Gunn 1984, 230). The fourth, "never-employ" force of 
self-extinction, resulting from the previous three, is that 
adjustment from a suboptimal capital-labor ratio is always 
by changing capital or decreasing labor, never by 
increasing labor, that is, adding labor would only have the 
effect of reducing income per worker. 
Next, assume a technology with increasing then 
decreasing returns to scale. During increasing return to 
scale, the forces of self-extinction are reduced (not 
eliminated) because the benefits of reducing membership are 
counteracted by the loss of scale economies. The first and 
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third forces are attenuated, and equilibrium is attained, 
but at socially inefficient levels. Also, the second force 
may not operate when law or firm-constitutional restraint 
forbids disinvestment or consumption of firm capital. The 
model explains how collective-assets cooperatives can first 
come to grow, but also come to underinvest, shrink, and 
devolve to one owner or disappear. 7 
The problem of institutional design is to align 
individual rationality with collective rationality. A 
provisional solution to the collective-assets problem is to 
attribute firm capital to the individual member. Each 
member has one share of ownership, and so becomes 
indifferent to whether surplus is paid as dividend or wage, 
and attains an individual interest in the accumulation of 
capital in the firm and an interest in the firm' s 
performance beyond his or her tenure. Sertel (1982) 
proposes a market of worker-partnership shares. 8 An 
arrangement of individual ownership also happens to 
dissolve the Illyrian perversities. Assuming individual 
objectives, according to Mygind (1982), "the objective of 
7The discussion is informed by Vanek (1977), Gunn 
(1980), Stephen (1982a), and Mygind (1986). 
8Gui (1984) states that tradable membership-shares 
are both grossly inefficient and contrary to democratic 
control of membership. 
maximizing income is, in this [individual] ownership 
structure, transformed to maximization of surplus, " (87), 
that is, net revenue minus market wage. 9 
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Individual ownership solves the Illyrian problem 
given individually maximizing behavior. Mygind (1982) 
enriches the discussion by adding that collective ownership 
is efficient to the extent that there are collective 
preferences. Some more plausible collective preferences 
might be for the long-run survival of the firm, 10 or for 
the expansion of the firm or of the cooperative moveme�t. 
Mygind argues that while a pure collective model is 
unrealistic, that individual- and collective-ownership 
elements can be "combined in accordance with the members' 
combination of individual and collective preferences. " 
Ben-Ner (1984) shows that, with success, the 
optimal collectively-owned producers' cooperative will 
contain only one member, the rest ·. of the workforce becoming 
hired employees ; while also successful individually-owned 
cooperatives will prefer cheaper employees to more 
expensive profit-sharing members. So, another tendency to 
degeneration arises when the membership right in the 
9This is formally derived by Sertel, according to 
Mygind. 
lOThis preference is individually rational to the 
extent of exit costs. 
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cooperative is identified with an ownership share . Most 
obviously, if vote is linked to share and one can own more 
than a single vote-share, the firm has become a joint-stock 
company, not a cooperative defined by one vote per member; 
where such schemes are enacted, transformation to capital 
control is rapid. 
More subtly, as a single vote-share cooperative 
matures and prospers, the value of the share increases to 
the point where young new members simply can not risk 
buying in, even if stock purchase is financed by the firm 
(in the more successful Northwest plywood cooperatives, the 
initial $ 1, 000 share grew 10, 20, or even 100 times in 
value from the birth of the firm). Thus, there is a new 
incentive to favor employment of nonmembers. That problem 
can be avoided through a firm-constitutional prohibition 
against (long-term) employment of nonmembers (at a possible 
cost to proper growth). 
However, that prohibition only worsens problems 
similar to the following. As an initial cohort of 
cooperators reaches retirement age they face � most 
imperfect market for their shares, and thus are tempted to 
sell the entire company to an outside interest, typically, 
of course, not another cooperative . The pioneer plywood 
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cooperative (Olympia Veneer, founded 19211 1) sold out in 
this fashion (Berman 1982) ; as did earlier U. S. 
cooperatives especially the Minneapolis cooperages, 
surviving a wave of cooperative formation in the 1880s 
(Jones 1977) , and more recently some cooperative scavenger 
companies in the San Francisco Bay area (Russell 1985) . 12 
These firms were probably more successful and long-lived 
due to their structure of individual-share ownership, but 
at the same time fated eventually to transform by that same 
structure. The effect has been widely observed among 
individually-owned cooperatives, and may have contributed 
to �arly cooperative doctrine' s preference for collective 
assets. 
The dilemma of individual and collective capital is 
solved, theoretically and with some practical utility, by 
Ellerman (1984 1986) , who recommends a redefinition of 
rights in the firm. First, in the conventional capitalist 
corporation , shareholders enjoy a property right which 
includes (1) voting rights, (2) economic profit rights, and 
(3) net book value rights. In the employee-owned 
corporation, the employee-shareholders own those same 
llRussell . . ( 1985, 178) . 
12rn this sector, the largest scavenger cooperative 
was sometimes the buyer. 
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property rights. Workplace democracy and participation are 
fleeting in employee-owned firms . Second, in the 
collectively-owned workers' cooperative, (1) voting rights 
and (2) economic profit rights are a membership right held 
by individual workers, while (3) net book value rights are 
collective or social property. These collectively-owned 
firms suffer from underinvestment and suicidal tendencies. 
Third, in the individually-owned workers' 
cooperative, (1) voting rights and (2) economic profit 
rights are each both a membership right and a property 
right by virtue of the individual' s ownership of a capital 
share, while (3) net book value rights are a property right 
by virtue of an ownership share. Note that such firms have 
gone only halfway in separating democratic voice from 
capital contribution. Such individually-owned firms are 
more likely to succeed, but the more successful they become 
the less affordable new membership becomes, inviting 
eventual sale to outside interests . 
Fourth, and preferred, is the solution of internal 
capital accounts. In this structure, (1) voting rights and 
(2) economic profit rights are personal rights held by 
virtue of membership in the cooperative, while (3) net book 
value rights remain property rights "apportioned among the 
members in a set of capital accounts. Each current 
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worker-member would have an internal capital account 
representing the_ equity value eventually due back the 
member" (Ellerman 1984, 877). The worker contributes to 
his or her capital account, which bears interest, and in 
accounting terms is a debt to the worker, due when the 
personal right of membership comes to an end. The firm' s 
debt to the member resembles a bond. Thus, the problems of 
collective ownership are avoided, in that capital is both 
recoverable and compensated (although a cooperative may 
choose to maintain an additional collective account, not 
assigned to individual members, to receive gifts and grants 
from members or outsiders, or for other collective 
purposes). And, the problems of individual ownership are 
avoided. 
A membership share could be issued for conformance 
to prevailing legal requirements, and a refundable 
membership fee charged so as to cushion debits and build 
commitment to the firm, but essentially membership is 
divorced from "ownership. " Where are the firm' s owners? 
Ellerman (1976, 1986) argues that the notion of "ownership" 
is fictional with respect to capitalist firms as well. The 
firm is defined by who is the hiring party, by contractual 
relations, not by "ownership" of the factors: 1 3  
1 3Jensen and Meckling (1976) make the same point, 
with quite different purposes, from the standpoint of 
mainstream economics. 
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There is only one fundamental difference in a 
labor-managed economy: The employer-employee contract 
is legally recognized as being an invalid contract. 
Any differences in property rights are more apparent 
than real. The differences are reflections of the 
basic inability to hire labor in a labor-managed 
economy. (Ellerman 1986, 76) 
Ellerman ' s  approach not only offers an elegant solution to 
the finance question, its clear definition of rights goes 
straight to the heart of the normative question. 
Barzelay and Thomas (1986), independently of 
Ellerman, propose an efficient capital market for a 
labor-controlled economy. The separation of ownership and 
control is an obvious feature of the modern business 
corporation. The capital market is said to be necessary 
for the efficient allocation of resources: 
Any remaining problems of justifying property rights in 
common stock owned by passive investors are surmounted 
in the most recent (neoclassical] contributions by 
dispensing with the concept of ownership altogether. 
Stockholders are now characterized functional_ly as 
"residual risk-bearers. " Their claims on the firm are 
not thought to be qualitatively different from those 
held by creditors. (227)· 
Labor-controlled firms, say Barzelay and Thomas, can issue 
two distinct equity instruments: residual claims with 
voting rights (type A stock) and pure residual claims (type 
B stock). When membership ends, type A stock converts 
automatically to type B stock. So, former members can sell 
their converted type B stock at the prevailing market 
5 7  
price. To the objection that members of the 
labor-controlled firm would have an incentive to transfer 
wealth from outside investors to themselves, Barzelay and 
Thomas answer that the incentive is identical in the 
conventionally managed firm, and that either type 9f firm 
can lower the price of its debt through the same methods 
celebrated in the finance literature: reputation for 
efficiency, and firm-constitutional constraint or bond 
covenant on transferring wealth from non-controlling 
investors to controlling investors. Meade { 1972) puts it 
well: "It must not be possible for a group of workers any 
more than . for an entrepreneur to borrow money, use the 
proceeds for riotous living, and then go bankrupt. " 
Gintis { 1989) on the other hand, argues that 
financial markets disfavor democratic enterprise because, 
owners can induce the firm to reflect their interests 
as residual claimants more effectively by directing 
their incentives to a small group of managers 
unaccountable to the firm' s membership, rather than by 
distributing these incentives to capital. {317) 
.- Gintis counts this as a market failure calling for public 
policy to grant credit to democratic enterprise. 
Empirical analysis of worker-managed firms only 
began to gain sophistication in the 1980s, explicitly 
following from earlier theoretical advances. The Stephen 
{ 1982b) collection surveys the performance of labor-managed 
• 
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firms in Yugoslavia, the U. S. , France, Spain (Mondragon), 
Ireland, Chile, Israel and West Germany. The Jones and 
Svejnar (1982) collection evaluates economic performance of 
participatory and self-managed firms in Chile, Yugoslavia, 
! 
Spain (Mondragon), Great Britain, West Germany, the U. S. , 
Italy, Israel, and the Third World. While appropriately 
professional, these initial views yielded findings more 
positive than their editors expected, and laid the ground 
for the first comparative work. 
Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (1987) present estimates 
of productivity effects of worker participation from three 
data sets covering 500 French producer cooperatives, 150 
Italian cooperatives, and 50 in Great Britain, with further 
partial consideration of producer cooperatives in Spain and 
the U. S. The firms differ in the proportion of workforce 
as members, participation bonus, capital stake, form of 
capital, and so on. The results support the prediction 
that the overall effect of participation is positive. 
Also,' 
The results suggest that, if higher productivity is the 
goal, producer cooperatives should provide for 
substantial sharing of profits and capital ownership by 
individual workers together with worker participation 
in decision-making. Collective ownership of assets 
ought to be avoided unless considerations other than 
productivity strongly justify its existence. (57) 
Thus, empirical observation supports the argument that 
individual- ownership works better than collective 
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ownership . Ellerman ' s  most preferred solution of internal 
capital accounts., an articulation of the successes of 
Mondragon, is the better form of individual ownership. 
The Mondragon cooperative complex in Basque Spain 
is the most robust experiment in democratic enterprise on 
record. The movement was founded in 1943 by a charismatic 
priest working in a vocational �ducation school, and the 
first economic enterprise was begun with 23 workers in 
1956 . By 1986, the complex included 103 cooperatives (at 
all levels of capital intensity) with a total of 19, 500  
workers, the largest firm comprising over 3, 000  workers; a 
credit cooperative with 3 0 0, 000  accounts, consumer and 
housing cooperatives, and several large educational 
institutions from a polytechnical school to a college . The 
members of a firm each have one vote and meet in general 
assembly meet once a year, and elect a supervisory board 
which supervises managers. In addition, a social council 
represents members as workers to management, a management 
council reports to the supervisory board, and a watchdog 
council, elected by the General Assembly, upholds the 
principles of cooperative law and spirit. Thus, Mondragon 
meets any reasonable condition of democratic control. 
Expansion has been rapid, and economic performance equals 
or exceeds capitalist counterparts { Thomas 1982 ; Whyte 
19 8 8 ) . 14  
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Gui (1984) distinguishes the Basque (Mondragon) and 
Illyrian (Yugoslav) labor-managed firms by the assignment 
of property rights. In the Illyrian firm "workers have no 
individual claim on the net assets of the firm but only on 
its current income, " while in the Basque firm "individual 
and collective claims on the net assets of the firm 
coexist: the former are called ' internal capital 
accounts' " (171). In the Illyrian firm workers receive a 
reference wage during the year, while in the Basque firm 
workers receive a reference wage and reference interest on 
their individual capital accounts. In the Illyrian firm 
"workers collectively decide whether to allocate the 
residual to investment in the firm or distribution" and 
distribution is proportional to the worker' s reference 
wage, while in the Basque firm the residual is allocated 
"partly to members proportionally to their reference income 
(wages plus interest)" (171) and partly to a collective 
fund. 
14Bradley and Gelb (1982) dismiss Basque ethnicity 
as an explanation for Mondragon' s success, but stress that 
low mobility and community attachment are important. Major 
accounts of Mondragon include Bradley and Gelb (1983), 
Thomas and Logan (1982), and Whyte and Whyte (1983). 
,,, 
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In the Basque firm, the member ' s  capital account is 
what the firm owes the member on exit, and also serves 
annually to make up excesses should the member's 
"advances, " or reference income, exceed actual income. 
Also, part of the surplus is distributed, by internal 
capital account, at variable annual rate, so that workers 
are rewarded for previous investment decisons. Thus, 
senior members happily · lack the . financial incentive to 
oppose adding to firm membership. These advantages are not 
shared by the Illyrian firm.  The Basque firm also, perhaps 
at some hazard, distributes a portion of surplus to the 
collective account . Gui says that the Basque collective 
fund works as firm-specific insurance in the event that new 
members are unable to cover their losses in a bad year from 
their individual capital account, and also protects the 
firm should an unforeseen number of members resign (and 
claim their individual capitals). Financial stability 
might better be provided, notes Gui, by providing for 
orderly delay in the refund of individual capital accounts. 
Environment and Firm survival 
So far we have considered the relationship of 
organizational form to firm survival in response to the 
question, Why so few labor-controlled firms? 1 5  Now, what 
is the relationship of the larger environment to firm 
survival? Just as organizational failure can be 
unconvincingly blamed on bad management, some partisans 
blame failure on ideological or competitive hostility. 16 
However vicious such hostility might become, some 
cooperative firms survive, while failed capitalist firms 
might be just as likely to blame failure on economic or 
political hostility. 
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A more sophisticated argument is that the absence 
of, democratic enterprise is due to some wholesale 
collective action problem, which, if solved, would deliver 
us from the argued suboptimality of capital hiring labor to 
the optimality of labor hiring capital. The simplest 
proposal, assuming the undesir'ability of economic 
pluralism, involves the argument that the availability of 
hired labor inexorably degenerates democratic enterprises, 
thus calling for total prohibition of the employer-employee 
relationship. This proposal must ignore the fact of 
successful cooperative firms and clusters. Miller (1981), 
15oow (1987) responds with a challenge to 
functionalist explanation in economics; Dow (1988) argues, 
alternatively, that market selection operatei on factor 
suppliers rather than firms, generating inefficient 
organizational forms. 
1 6oescribed, but not endorsed, by Abell (1982). 
1 
I 
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considering the democratic firm' s choice between 
individualized assets versus collectivized assets, 
concludes that mixed assets are the optimum solution, 
making cooperatives less- attractive to lenders than 
capitalist firms, and thereby demonstrating that the market 
itself discriminates against certain preferences, requiring 
a fiat solution to the collective dilemma of transition. 
Miller cites the enclave of (voluntary) Mondragon as an 
example of the resolved dilemma. Miller-- does not mention 
Ellerman' s solution of internal capital accounts, inspired 
by Mondragon, which vitiates his bold assault on market 
.neutrality. Gintis (1989) makes preferences of the capital 
market the collective obstacle. 
Futterman (1982), portrays it as a problem of 
externalities, that participatory cooperatives produce the 
positive externality of democratic and entreprenerial 
members with better dynamic results for society: 
While static economizing on scarce decision-making 
capabilities, which characterizes hierarchical 
organizations, may be advantageous in the short run, 
this same characteristic may have an associated 
property of retarding such multiplication of 
capabilities as might be brought about by a more 
participatory system , and which might, in fact, prove 
widely beneficial . . . .  (149) 
. . .  To forbid persons from entering into employment 
contracts which forfeit their rights to a say in 
enterprise·decision-making may some day be seen as 
analogous to prohibiting the sale of one' s vote in an 
election, voiding even voluntarily entered contracts of 
slavery or indentured servitude, or outlawing 
prostitution. (159) 
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Ben-Ner (1988a) analyzed available quantitative 
information on worker-owned and capitalist firms in France, 
Italy, Sweden and Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the 
U. S. The worker-owned sector is small, generally less than 
one percent, · but growing; for example, in five of the 
countries both firm and employment growth in the 
w6rker-owned sector exceed the same in the capitalist 
sector from 1970 to 1983 (with a possible relationship to 
increasing unemployment in those economies). In addition 
to finding that worker-owned firms are heterogeneous, 
smaller, and concentrated in a few industries, Ben-Ner 
found that the dissolution rates of worker-owned firms are 
at least as low as that for capitalist firms, with the 
qualification that firm age distribution differs between 
the sectors (worker-owned firms tend to be younger, and 
would thus suffer an increased mortality rate from the 
"liability of newness"). In the case of Great Britain, 
data were available to disentangle the effect of differing 
age distributions, with the result that worker-owned firms 
were at much less hazard of demise than capitalist firms. 
These findings are plausible, but surprising. If reliable, 
they suggest that a cooperative sector could grow through 
piecemeal encouragement rather than global command. 
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Problems of Formation 
Next, what is the relationship between cooperative 
form and firm formation? According to Ben-Ner' s review 
(1988b), 
The formation of a new firm requires premeditation and 
planning by entrepreneurs, the assumption of the risk 
.of losses, the provision of capital, and the bearing of 
set up costs . • • •  For a firm to be formed as a 
worker-owned firm workers must be active in all four 
areas . • . •  However, workers · are at a disadvantage in 
all four areas. (289) 
Scarce entrepreneurial skill, if self-interested, will not 
form a democratic firm to the extent that the capitalist 
form permits larger capture of entrepreneurial profits. 
Workers are short on capital, and will prefer a certain 
lower wage to the risky higher wage attendant on firm 
formation.  As well, workers are denied the safety of asset 
diversification if they invest in the same firm where they 
work. Democratic enterprises will form only when such 
disadvantages are reduced, or when advantages from 
formation exceed the enumerated disadvantages. 
To. supplement Ben-Ner' s review, "the costs of 
organization are an increasing function of the number of 
individuals in the group" (Olson 1965, 46). In the 
abstract, a single founder faces only (12- 1)/ 2 = O 
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founding agreements, two founders (2 2- 2)/2 = 2 agreements, 
four founders (42- 4)/2 = 6 agreements, and n founders 
(n2- n)/2 founding agreements. The larger the group, the 
more difficult its escape from latency. 17 This applies 
only to the key problem of formation of the enterprise. 
Thereafter, even a sole proprietorship will contain n - 1 
employees and (n2- 1)/ 2 possible relationships. The 
difficulty of organizing larger groups may explain the 
casual observation that worker cooperatives are more 
obviously formed as worker buyouts of ailing firms, where 
the workforce is already present, incipiently organized, 
and faces simple collective choices. (Failing firms are 
not easily rescued, and the high failure rate of 
desperation buyouts prejudices the success record of worker 
cooperatives. ) 
Finally, what is the relationship between the 
larger environment and firm formation? Again, following · 
Ben-Ner (1988b), (1) acquisition of information about rare 
worker-controlled firms is costlier than for common 
capitalist firms, (2) organizational, legal, and financial 
expertise particular to democratic enterprise is more 
scarce and therefore more expensive than for capitalist 
17Krouse and McPherson (1986) report a similar 
argument by Roemer, without a precise citation. 
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enterprises, (3) the complex and hazardous legal 
environment is tailored to the capitalist firm, and (4) the 
unfamiliarity of democratic .enterprise adds a risk premium 
to credit. Successful cooperative ent�rprises seem to 
occur in sectoral clusters, such as legal and medical 
partnerships, taxi cooperatives, or the Bay area scavenger 
companies. Russell ' s  (1985) explanation for such 
clustering is that cooperatives succeed where conventional 
enterprise fails, that is, where metering of work is very 
costly, and where there is an further advantage of 
association over self-employment. A supplemental 
explanation, or a competing explanation in the case .of 
geographical clust�rs such as Mondragon� not mentioned by 
Russell, is that the initial costs of information, 
expertise, legislation, and credit reputation are roughly 
the same whether· for one firm or many, a public good. Once 
a successful pioneer clears the way,. cooperative imitators 
can follow (a cluster of cooperatives can also learn from 
one another' s operational experiments). Imitation is 
cheaper than innovation. With the example of Mondragon 
firmly in mind, a number of analysts have come to emphasize 
the special need for an overall support organization (Gunn 
1 9 8 4 ) 
The presence of s6me · cooperative clusters suggests 
a new conjecture. The prevalence of a certain form of 
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enterprise could follow merely from a slight change in 
initial conditions. Conventional economic theory is based 
on the idea of diminishing returns, which is the case for 
resource-based production. However, there may be 
increasing returns elsewhere in the economy, especially in 
knowledge (Arthur 1990), and organizational form is more a 
matter of knowledge than resources. Admission of 
increasing returns, says Arthur, destroys, 
the world of unique, predictable equilibria and the 
notion that the market ' s  choice was always best . . . .  
In the real world, if several similar-size firms 
entered a market at the same time, small fortuitous 
events . . .  would help determine which ones achieved 
early sales and, over time, which firm dominated. 
Economic activity is quantized by individual 
transactions that are too small to observe, and these 
small "random" events can accumulate and become 
magnified by positive feedbacks so as to determine the 
eventual outcome. (94) 
Arthur applies the model to the contest between Beta and 
VHS video cassette standard, to the adoption of regional 
rail gauges, to choice of civilian nuclear-reactor 
technology, and to the locational clustering of similar 
firms, in each case arguing the possibility of multiple 
equilibria. Accidental standards become locked in by 
positive feedback. The Qwerty typewriter keyboard is 
technically inferior to Dvorak for example, but absent 
extra-market change, Qwerty will remain standard. 
The cooperative form of enterprise does not seem 
peculiarly appropriate to the process of plywood 
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production. The cultural accident of cooperative formation 
in an isolated region with new technology in 1921 led to a 
cluster of cooperative firms, which ceased expanding in the 
1950s as the national economy grew to surround the cluster. 
Our immensely productive economic system is only a few 
lifetimes old, and arose against a feudal system of 
coercive personal authority (up to a few years ago the law 
of the employment relationship was known by its ancient 
title, the law of master and servant). The prevalence of 
autocracy in the firm may be merely an accident of origin. 
Machiavelli' s account of the city' s luck in the genius of 
. its founder is echoed in accounts of the genius of 
Mondragon' s founder. Maybe the ideas of a simple priest in 
a backwater Basque vocational school were like the flapping 
of the butterfly' s wings which set off a tornado on the 
other side of the world. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RISE OF THE HOEDADS 
Introduction 
The forest workers' cooperative movement in the 
Pacific Northwest was recently considered one of the more 
promising such new efforts in America. Christopher Gunn, 
an economist with an interest in self-management, whose 
comparative study of cooperative enterprises included 
scholarly study of the forest workers (1984a), had this to 
say of the movement' s flagship firm: 
Hoedads Co-op, Inc. , a reforestation cooperative of 
approximately 300 members· based in Eugene, Oregon, 
holds a significant place in the history of ·American 
worker cooperatives. In its internal decision-making 
process it sets high standards of commitment to 
egalitarianism and democracy. In its external 
relations, it has shown a willingness to devote energy 
and resources to progressive social, environmental, and 
political causes in the Northwest . . . .  It has not 
only demonstrated the ability to survive and prosper 
but it has also served as fertile ground for the 
formation of other co-ops. (Gunn 1984b, 141) 
The movement gained in strength from its origins 
around 1970 to a peak of some dozen cooperatives with 
around 700 members in 1980. 1 Total membership began to 
1Membership figures vary widely, according to 
assumptions. These are the writer' s most conservative 
estimates of working members, based on imperfect data. 
f i:: 
7 1  
decline in 1981, and plunged after 1983. Two cooperatives 
with some 80 members between them survived the collapse. 
Thus, there is a record of considerable success, 
considerable failure, and apparent instability. 
TABLE .1. Annual Working Membership, 1972-1989 
Year · Hoedads All Coops 
1972 . 30 30 
1973 125 125 
1974 200 200 
1975 250 300 
1976 300 400 
1977 350 500 
1978 325 575 
1979 300 650 
1980 250 675 
1981 200 650 
1982 150 600 
1983 100 500 
1984 30 350 
1985 25 225 
1986 15 70 
1987 30 85 
1988 30 85 
1989 30 85 
I was a member or fellow-traveler of this 
cooperative movement for fourteen consecutive years 
(1972-1986), and for seven of those years held top 
leadership positions, in Hoedads (1975-1977) and in the 
league of cooperatives, the Northwest Forest Workers 
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Association (1982-1986) which I helped found in 1976. The 
movement was reported by Gunn (1984, 1986), and the origins 
of the Hoedads are recounted in Hartzell (1987) . 2 The 
present essay will not repeat at length the descriptive 
features of those earlier publications, but instead offers 
new analysis informed by theoretical concerns over 
incentives, institutional design, and viability of workers' 
cooperatives. 
Early Market and Social Environment 
The first firms in this movement were the Hoedads 
(Eugene, Oregon), and two smaller cooperatives, Green Side 
up3 (Takilma, Oregon) and Marmot (Seattle, Washington). 
The three firms were founded independently in the early 
1970s, without knowledge of one another' s existence, and 
were more or less spontaneous in not being the product of 
any specifically ideological agenda nor of any 
interventionist project. At the same time , reforestation 
cooperatives spontaneously formed in the Canadian province 
2
r reviewed Gunn' s manuscript (1984), was the 
primary source for Gunn (1986) , and assisted in researching 
the Hartzell (1987) book. 
3 From the instructions to the mythically stupid 
treeplanter: green side up, brown side down. 
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of British Columbia, under different national conditions. 4 
Therefore, conditions of the particular market, the 
production process, and the larger social environment which 
contributed to the independent and spontaneous formation of 
the cooperative enterprises deserve attention. 
The first, and always central, work of the 
cooperatives was tree planting for the timber industry of 
the Pacific Northwest. This is usually done under 
short-term (two weeks to two months) contract with the U. S. 
Forest Service and the federal Bureau of Land Management, 
which own the majority of productive timber land in the 
region, and with private timber-owning and -harvesting 
companies such as Weyerhaeuser and International Paper. 
These are competitive contracts r usually let to the lowest 
bidder. For any given · microclimate, there are only a few 
weeks or few months of the year it is feasible to plant 
surviving trees. Thus a typical reforestation firm, 
cooperative or privately-owned , seeks to assemble a steady 
flow of work from a large number of small, overlapping 
contracts; a typical work season would involve the Oregon 
Coast Range and the low Cascades in the Winter, the higher 
Cascades in the early Spring, and more remote 
4oata on the Canadian cooperatives would allow for 
richer comparisons, but would require prohibitively costly 
research effort. 
_j 
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high-elevation work in the Great Basin and Rockies in the 
late Spring (a bonanza paying far more than Winter work due 
to decreased competition and premiums on mobility and 
risk), followed by miscellaneous and more optional forestry 
work such as firefighting, trail building, seed collection, 
and precommercial forest thinning in the Summer and Fall. 
In the bitter Winter, crews prefer to wor� from their 
homes, but later end up hitting the road, camping out as 
comfortably as possible or staying in motels. 5 This work 
pattern presents a considerable problem of social 
coordination and individual motivation. There are obvious 
economies of scale, not only in administration, but 
especially in being able to assemble steady rather than 
sporadic work. 
such reforestation contract activities have been a 
busy little sector of the regional economy since the late 
1960s; in the 1970s, probably 3, 000 workers in Oregon 
relied primarily on reforestation for their basic 
livelihoods, and 5, 000 altogether in the larger region . 
The work had noncommercial beginnings. In the 1930s, some 
primitive reforestation was done by New Deal agencies for 
conservation and work-relief purposes. In Oregon in the 
5There are large variations from the ideal pattern 
described. 
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1940s and 50s, schoolchildren helped replant the gigantic 
Tillamook Burn. As the timber harvest relentlessly 
proceeded in supplying the post-war housing boom, the huge 
timber resources of the region began to appear meaningfully 
finite. By the late 1960s large forest landowners and the 
federal land management agencies calculated that replanting 
and other intensified management of cutover lands was more 
economically rational and thus worthy of investment than 
the previous dependence on natural regeneration (later, 
reforestation of cutover land and other standardized 
forestry practices were mandated by state law as an 
industry-sought public-good). There had been two or three 
small commercial reforestation contractors, but now the 
business began to grow. Thus, the first reforestation 
cooperatives formed in an essentially new line of work. 
In the 1960s, agricultural work in Oregon was done 
by students , housewives, remaining dust-bowl emigrants, 
skid road transients, and some Mexican-Americans from 
California and Texas. 6 The use of labor from Mexico was 
rare and controversial, and limited to former Bracero 
overlords in the pear orchards around /Medford, Oregon, and 
to a small colony working cannery crops in Woodburn, Oregon 
6r ,  like other schoolchildren in those days, worked 
picking green beans, strawberries and raspberries for 
· spending money. 
in the north Willamette Valley. The first reforestation 
contractors in the late 1960s resembled the 
agricultural-labor contractors of the day, and recruited 
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among college-age youth, skid-road transients, and other 
elements of the agricultural labor pool. There were few 
barriers to business entry. Contractors recruited on 
street corners and by classified advertisement. The work 
was more physically demanding than most agricultural labor, 
but paid better too. Youth from the flourishing new 
counterculture began to enter the work because it was 
outdoors, casual, and high-paying; such workers were less 
desperate but also more healthy than their usual 
predecessors, the skid-readers. Personnel turnover was 
enormous, working conditions were ugly, and wage promises 
were frequently violated. 
The science of silviculture was undeveloped. The 
early objective was to plant large numbers of tree 
seedlings at high density with no quality considerations ,  
on the bet that quantity would make up for future 
mortality. Landowners offered contracts on a quantity 
basis; contractors were paid on a piece-rate basis, 
supposedly by the number of trees planted. This initial 
incentive system was irrational from the outset, but 
persisted for many years. What happened in reality was 
'/ 
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that landowners were paying contractors to make tree 
seedlings disappear, and the successful contractors 
obliged. "Tree-stashing" was universal. When outside the 
supervision of the landowner, the contractor would 
clandestinely dispose of thousands of trees. When under 
landowner supervision, the. contractor relied on incentives 
to establish silent collusion with the crew . To satisfy 
the landowners' interest in getting the trees planted, the 
contractor would maintain and enforce work rules against 
stashing trees (a properly skilled treeplanter can "stash" 
--secretly bury safe from detection--as many or more trees 
as he plants in a day). When the landowner' s agent would 
discover such activity, the contractor would fire the 
culpable workers (perhaps only to rehire them on the next 
job); but meanwhile the contractor paid his crew on a 
piece-rate basis and enforced daily production quotas 
impossible to satisfy except through heavy stashing. 
Generally, by one' s second day ·on the job came the 
realization of the real work requirement : stash but don' t 
get caught . .Some workers hated the unfair d,ouble bind. 
Entry barriers were low, and contract competition was 
fluid, so that the system quickly selected the most 
dishonest contractors for survival. Dishonesty is usually 
indivisible, and, naturally, personalities willing to cheat 
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forest landowners were just as willing to cheat their 
workers whenever calculation permitted. A few contractors 
in niches traded on good reputation. 
Tree planters (and presumably other economic 
actors) are highly alert to incentives. Production and pay 
are daily topics of conversation, market conditions and 
contractor reputations the stuff of barroom gossip, 
pleasant social exchange includes economic information. In 
the early days newly experienced forestry workers came to 
face a problem and an opportunity. ,  " The problem was that 
"::•r� ... 
many contractors were dishonest, and wage contracts were 
relatively unenforceable, because work occurred at rapidly 
changing remote sites and wage j udgments are costly to 
obtain and difficult to collect against elusive low-capital 
enterprises. In reforestation, there was an especially 
strong incentive for the worker to find a more reliable 
work arrangement. Most employment contracts are 
unenforceable to varying degrees, but the greater the 
hazard of loss from employer opportunism and the lower the 
cost of an alternative, the more likely is it that a novel 
solution could occur. 
The opportunity in reforestation was that, once the 
work crew is trained and organized, there was little 
barrier to setting up as a contractor rather than for a 
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contractor. The germ of one cooperative, for example, was 
a few friends who had been working for an employer so 
unreliable that for the last · month of the season the crew 
worked without a foreman (and later didn' t get paid). Said 
one, "It became obvious we could do the work ourselves when 
we were working without a foreman . It seemed like we 
could do the job without some contractor" (Hartzell 1987, 
35). The only services a contractor provided to a 
functioning crew, other than a propensity to run off with 
the cash, was liquidity to front pay, ability to post 
performance bonds, minor capital equipment, and access to 
work; in short, capital and established supply 
relationships. Additionally, the bearing of set up costs 
and the. accumulation of initial capital, in the form of 
reduced and greatly delayed compensation, was tolerable for 
cooperative forest workers, oddly enough becau�e workers 
were accustomed to sporadic pay. 
A number of occupations come to mind (farm labor , 
domestic service) where there is a high hazard . of employer 
opportunism and low barrier to business entry, but where 
cooperatives are not prominent, so additional explanations 
must be sought. As already noted, reforestation was a new 
line of work. A special condition which contributed to 
spontaneous cooperative formation was the fact that more 
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than half the reforestation work was with federal agencies 
on a strict low-bid basis, so a new firm could compete on 
• pure price considerations rather than having to penetrate 
the web of personal connections attendant to many private 
contracting relationships. (In later years, a number of 
corporate landowners tacitly refused to do business with 
cooperatives for political reasons; such was Weyerhaeuser' s 
open and official policy. ) Other special conditions were 
the simple desire to make a living as the baby-boom 
labor-glut choked off customary routes of mobility, and the 
spillover of relatively educated workers into a primitive 
.labor market; similar youth could be found following 
Northwest orchard work at the time. 7 There , was also the 
experimental arid egalitarian spirit of the counterculture, 
with the aspiration to build alternative institutions 
rather than become individual entrepreneurs. Also, in 
early reforestation, a new individual entrepreneur would be 
at a formation disadvantage over a new cooperative , because 
suspicious workers would have no reason on earth to trust 
him. 
Ben-Ner (1988b) observes that democratic 
enterprises will form only when advantages of formation 
7A group very similar in form to the Hoedads 
emerged in New England apple work in the early 1970s, but 
was harassed by threatened competitors on payroll-tax 
issues and disappeared. 
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exceed the disadvantages a collection of workers face in 
comparison to an entrepreneur: planning, assumption of 
risk of losses, provision of capital and bearing of set up 
costs. Also, the rarity of the cooperative form puts it at 
an information disadvantage, in discovering how to organize 
as a democratic firm, in obtaining support professionals 
with cooperative expertise, in adjusting to the legal 
environment, and in obtaining credit. These were problems 
for the reforestation cooperatives. 8 For the reforestation 
cooperatives, the advantages of formation were high, and 
the capital barrier low. Russell (1985) says that 
cooperatives have an advantage when metering of work is 
very costly and where there is a further advantage of 
association over self-employment. In most reforestation 
activity team work is required, requiring association over 
individual self-employment, but metering is not especially 
costly; however, the peculiar production process may have 
otherwise contributed to the spontaneous formation of 
cooperative enterprises. 
8For example, when Hoedads needed to obtain crucial 
new performance-bonding, I recall . an interview where the 
agent from one insurance company· was enthusiastic about 
winning such a safe account, but his superiors could not 
understand the company and thus declined coverage. 
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Production Process 
The following notice on treep�anting referrals was 
long posted in the Eugene, Oregon office of the Job 
Service: 
It is the hardest physical work known to this office. 
The most comparative physical requirement is that of a 
five-mile cross-mountain run, daily. If all body 
joints are in very good condition, a person has 
excellent persistence and at four-and-a-half miles of 
your self-trial run, you know you can do it, and 
persuade the foreman, you may make it the three weeks 
it takes to really learn how to be a team member on a 
planting crew . . . .  Of those who adequately persist to. 
get on the two�hour crummy ride for a trial, one person 
in fifty succeeds for the three week training period. 
It actually is a good job for some. (Hartzell 1987, 27 ) 
The extreme physical challenge of the work quickly reveals 
personality, and shared misery can lead to affective 
solidarity. The bond of hard work is akin to that observed 
of occupations· such as premechanized longshoring (the major 
difference is that longshoring is fixed at one port, while 
forestry and logging work is mobile and remote) . By the 
end of a season f·or a contractor one well knows one' s 
randomly drawn coworkers, and if lucky might like some of 
them. Small ac.cidental solidarity formations from 
contractor employment and town and country counterculture 
life became small working partnerships. 
Team production, generally, is a collective 
dilemma. Under the quantity emphasis of early tree 
�­
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planting, piece-rate pay was optfft!al for promoting actual 
production and for generating fraudulent proceeds to the 
contractor, but suboptimal for the landowner. Landowners 
became aware of their fraud losses, and some (especially 
the U. S. Forest Service) began to develop contracts which 
paid the contractor on a per-acre basis rather than a 
per-tree basis, removing the perverse incentive for making 
trees disappear. Conventional dishonest contractors, sunk 
in routine, were at an immediate disadvantage on per-acre 
contracts. They did not or could not adjust crew 
operations and incentives between per-tree and per-acre 
jobs. On a per-tree contract, the more trees that the 
contractor and workers made disappear, the better the 
reward to effort. on a per-acre contract it is just the 
opposite, the fewer trees the crew plants, the better the 
reward · to effort. The early partnerships quickly came to 
prefer and specialize in this new kind of contract, 
engaging only experienced partners and typically paying by 
equal daily share, with enormous efficiency and pay 
advantages over piece-rate contractors. A strong norm 
against the despised practice of tree-stashing carried over 
onto piece-rate jobs where the . partnerships hoped to gain 
by reputation. A new market niche was opened, and the 
first cooperatives were there to exploit it. The 
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accidental advantage from gradual landowner changeover to 
per-acre contracts rewarded preexisting cultural preference 
for cooperative enterprise. 
Tree planting requires a crew of six to twenty 
(because of joint savings on transportation and work 
location; smaller and it' s not worthwhile for the landowner 
to deliver trees to the site, larger and coordination 
. fails). In early morning darkness one meets the "crummy" 
(an old Northwest logging term for crew-carrying vehicle) 
and then rides together with the crew for one to three 
hours to the work site (and back again at night). For 
longer distances from home, one will camp or rent together 
with one' s crew; even when on the road, one will have a 
crummy-commute to frequently changing work sites. As the 
mist lightens in the early dawn one catches glimpses of a 
10 to 400 acre clearcut, blackened because burned to remove 
brush. One meets the representative of the landowner, who 
delivers trees and inspects completed production for 
contract compliance. 
Each planter loads up special waist bags with 20 to 
50 pounds of trees and grabs a planting tool called a 
hoedad, and together the crew will walk off the landing 
onto the bare steep hillside. Every ten feet or so 
(depending on the contract specifications), the planter 
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will clear ground, punch a one-foot hole, place the 
seedling without tangled roots, close the hole and move on. 
The crew works in a line, as if each planter were a bead on 
an elastic string. This string stretches, shrinks, 
zigzags, and squiggles through the day in the manner most 
conducive to covering the particular ground so that one is 
always planting rather than wasting time walking, and so 
that one neatly plants back to the crummy for lunch. One 
follows the line of planted trees left by the planter 
ahead, the line can be left so that it' s easy or hard for 
the follower. Experienced workers can plant back and forth 
on the line together so as to minimize crew motion over the 
microterrain; an outsider sees apparently uncoordinated 
wandering rather than any "line, " but the insiders are 
following tacit rules of motion, sometimes signalled by 
brief shouts of jargon. 
The purpose of· the description is to elucidate the 
collective dilemmas inherent in a particular production 
process, and how those dilemmas are resolved under 
different methods of organization. The conventional 
argument from the economics of the firm is that the 
sovereignty of the contractor over his employee-subjects, 
his ability to make and enforce rules and make 
side-payments, coercion in short, is the best or only 
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escape from suboptimality. Tree planting is unusually 
hard, and so the incentive to shirk is high. On the 
government-hired fixed-wage crew productivity is probably 
two to ten times lower than industry standards, and that 
form is extremely rare. On a per-tree contract, a 
contractor paying piece-rate to his crew has little 
pecuniary incentive to encourage team production and does 
so only to the extent he finds morale useful or humanly 
desirable. A fast planter is put in the lead to pull the 
crew, the foreman gives orders for attac�ing the geography 
and enforces production quotas and other driving work 
rules, while the individual worker' s quest for production . 
creates an incentive to make externalities for coworkers 
(say, cutting off the line so one' s neighbor has to walk to 
new ground} .  Minimal remaining sociality helps a little, 
but such work is as miserable as it sounds. The worker is 
motivated by piece-rate quantity incentives and by 
additional coercion from the boss. 
A cooperative crew working under a per-tree 
contract is subject to minor advantages and disadvantages 
in comparison to the employee crew. If the crew chooses to 
pay piece-rate compensation (so many cents for each tree 
planted} ,  then quantity incentives are equivalent. (If the 
crew chooses to pay equal daily share compensation, raw 
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production can decline or improve, as will be discussed 
below. ) The advantages of swift dictatorial coercion are 
lost, but the advantages of natural sociality are gained . 
Production coordination can actually improve with an 
experienced cooperative crew because the latent work team 
is no longer wholly devoted to material and moral war with 
one another and the boss, and further is free to develop 
and operate as a natural team. Freed communications allow 
social pressure to reduce the generation of externalities 
by individual planters. The release of natural sociality 
provides advantages, such as mild to moderate informal 
rebuke of individual deviance, but also some disadvantages, 
such as • intermittent loss of operational unity and 
consequent resort to expensive formal democracy, and the 
comparative inability to collectively impose harsh 
discipline. Production is roughly the same on a 
cooperative crew working a per-tree contract, or lower per 
person because of newly satisfied preference for unpaid 
leisure available under more flexible work routines, or 
lower overall because of the elimination of driving 
production quotas. Depending on one' s viewpoint, the 
cooperative might be at a disadvantage in that members have 
greater power to avoid dangerous work-pace or situations. 
In the early reforestation market, the cooperative offered 
,,, 
the clear advantage of reliable pay, and slightly better 
piece-rate compensation through collective capture of the 
residual. 
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Tree-stashing was out, in that it is  difficult for 
larger groups to resolve on dishonesty or illegality, if 
for no other reason than' the old saying that two people can 
keep a secret only so long as one of them is dead. The 
refusal to cheat was often a disadvantage, sometimes 
countered by reputation advantage in market niches . 
Nowhere in the industrial-democracy literature, so far as I 
have been able to discover, is this special consequence of 
open democratic deliberation, the difficulty in openly 
resolving on deception, mentioned. A cooperative work 
group relies on trust, so members advocating systematic 
deception of outsiders immediately throw themselves into 
suspicion (this does not imply angelic virtue). This may 
be a comparative competitive burden but socially useful 
externality of the cooperative form of enterprise . 
In the early market, a contractor working a crew on 
a per-acre contract was at a large disadvantage. On a 
per-acre contract, the landowner requires that trees be 
planted at a certain spacing, typically on a ten foot by 
ten foot grid, but pays not by the number of trees that 
have disappeared but per acre actually planted1 based on 
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inspection samples verifying that trees are planted at the 
required spacing. A contractor crew working under a 
per-tree piece-rate pay system (because of the team 
production process and measurement costs it is infeasible 
to pay individual planters by the acre) will both stash 
trees and overplant the site. In addition, per-acre 
contracts would also usually assign a penalty to the 
contractor for heavy overplanting. So the contractor got 
paid for a fixed number of trees, but rewarded his crew for 
making the maximum number of trees disappear. The 
I • contractor, who before had imposed discipline only through 
the simple methods of piece-rate pay and termination for 
falling below quantity quotas, attempted to solve.this 
incentive disparity through supervision. The planter was 
paid for planting more, but the foreman would cajole him to 
plant fewer (it takes less effort to plant trees closer 
rather than farther apart). This was worsened in that the 
contractor would be moving the crew between per-acre and 
per-tree j obs, continually confusing incentive signals. 
The contractor crew cares about its own pay incentives, not 
about the contract incentives determining the contractor' s 
residuals. 
The first partnerships, operating only with 
experienced workers, often worked by share compensation. 
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Even when the share pay system resulted in less quantity 
production (and this was not always the case), the 
cooperative crew could more efficiently obtain the 
production objective on per-acre contracts. This was 
because of the superiority of social supervision over 
external supervision in the particular production 
circumstances; and because of the economic incentive 
structure. One autocratic and alien supervisor set over a 
work team of twelve dispersed over the slope can only watch 
the work of two or three planters at once. Following after 
into a planted-over area, it is difficult to identify who 
planted which trees. The individual' s response is 
predictable: when the foreman is watching, one benefits by 
working to his rule; when the foreman is busy elsewhere, 
one benefits by stashing and overplanting. Supervision can 
be strengthened by forcing the crew to work very close 
together, but that considerably slows production, to their 
unhappiness. 
Social supervision on a cooperative crew is more 
efficient. Here, each worker on the line (except the lead 
and tail planters) has two supervisors, the planter to the 
left and the planter to the right. It is nearly costless 
to observe the work of one' s neighbors on the line, and if 
their planting is too close or otherwise unsatisfactory, it 
. , - �  
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can be declared to the group . Also, when an inspection 
sample reveals poor quality, cooperative planters, lacking 
incentives for team shirking against the boss, are more 
willing to remember and identify who planted the sampled 
trees (although the task is inherently problematic). In 
the later 1980s, when a much smaller Hoedads went to 
employing potential new members, it was discovered that 
interspersing employees on a member crew (up to half the 
crew as employees) worked much better than setting a member 
as supervisor over an all-employee crew. 
Elster and Moene (1989) observe that "not all 
production processes lend themselves easily to the workers' .. 
monitoring of one another that may be a condition for a 
viable cooperative, " arguing further that such constraints 
need not be fixed in the long run, as a strong and stable 
cooperative sector "would have incentive to channel 
technical change and factory design to overcome these 
difficulties" (27) . 
What Downs { 1965, 60) calls small-group social 
incentives (acceptance, disapproval, prestige, self-esteem, 
status) are also at play on the cooperative work crew. For 
example, when working under a piece-rate pay system, a 
cooperative crew finds that the summed tree totals each 
individual reports to the crew for the day exceed the 
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number of trees that the landowner has delivered. This is 
handled by one or two individuals ostentatiously comparing 
crew and landowner totals at the end of the day, along with 
probing looks, or more aggressively by observations on how 
the discrepancy varies according to the presence or absence 
of certain members. Most adjustments come from frequent 
informal exchange on the job, but serious deviance can only 
be dealt with in a formal democratic meeting. 
The cooperative crew working on a per-acre contract 
also has superior economic ince'ntives, but -not in the 
conventional sense. The contractor must keep up production 
with individual piece-rates, but then faces a sort of 
shirking (stashing and overplanting) that is supposedly 
solved, due to his superior motivation in capturing the 
residual, by intensified (but ineffective) supervision and 
side-payments .  The cooperative crew collectively captures 
the residual, diluted through distribution to each member. 
But the sum total of dollars is the same, only in one case 
concentrated in a distant individual, in the other case 
distributed among members of the close work team. Although 
the total surplus is diluted if distributed among the work 
team, workers' lower incomes would mean that each dollar is 
worth more to them than to the boss, which increases the 
team incentive . 
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Team production is a collective dilemma. The 
cooperative work team collectively suffers arguably the 
same dollar loss as would an owner when its performance is 
suboptimal, but the loss, even though diluted, is felt by 
each individual who is working rather than mostly by the 
sovereign owner, who because of his thirst for monopolizing 
the surplus, has less than the total surplus to reward for 
optimal performance. The contractor's residual must come 
from his ability to impose extra-market discipline. When 
the cooperative crew's performance is suboptimal, through 
low effort, or wasted effort and contract penalty for 
overplanting, or low quality requiring that the site be 
reworked for no new compensation, the cost is borne by the 
crew and by its individual members (according to whatever 
pay system the .crew has in effect). 
Beyond the significant advantage of social 
supervision, any member of the cooperative crew can engage 
in some undetectable shirking to his individual benefit , 
and when he does collective pay goes down, sometimes 
dramatically. A collective dilemma still remains. The 
cooperative crews somehow resolved the dilemma (those that 
did not failed on the slopes), although it is not possible 
from the data to isolate which mechanisms were decisive in 
winning optimal outcomes. Many initial groups seemed to 
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hit the ground cooperating, while a few seemed doomed from 
the first day. Crews had very strong identities, and 
clearly differed in collective personality; stronger crews 
had stronger identities. Because of the democratic form 
and spirit, discussion, informal and formal, was frequent. 
Promises were common, but mostly in the task of committing 
to certain spans of work. Social incentives operated, but 
were not ubiquitous. Individuals definitely carried 
reputations as more cooperative or less cooperative, 
affecting their ability to work with other crews as 
conditions shifted, or even whether they stayed on their 
home crew . The longer the same people stayed together on a 
crew, the better their cooperative performance. Sometimes 
the remainder of an old successful crew would add new 
individuals, but never recover the cooperative spirit. 
Towards the end of the season, defection did sometimes crop 
up, especially among individuals planning on leaving, 
suggesting that iteration played a role, but was not 
universal. 
Rothschild and Whitt (1986), reporting on American 
countercultural institutions of the 1970s, pose a contrast 
between collectivist-democratic organization and the 
bureaucratic organization. The collectivist-democratic 
organization relies on limited rules and delegation of 
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authority, consensus, absence of division of labor and 
hierarchy, egalitarian pay with normative incentives, and 
so on. Such organizations proved small and unstable. The 
Rothschild-Whitt model does not apply to the reforestation 
cooperatives i Mansbridge (1980), in a study of a New 
England town governed by direct democracy and of a 
socially-engaged work collective, came to contrast 
large-scale adversary democracy to small-scale unitary 
democracy. Unitary democracy is characterized by 
qualitative equality, consensus, face-to-face contact, and 
common interests, that is, some individual identification 
with the group interest. 
Mansbridge declares her recent collection (1990) a 
manifesto for amending the dominant self-interest model to 
include "pro-social" motivations in social-science 
analysis: 
The seemingly cautious strategy of designing 
institutions to work only on self-interest, so that if 
there is little or no public spirit the institutions 
will work anyway, will in some conditions erode 
whatever public spirit might otherwise exist. But the 
alternative strategy of assuming a high level of public 
spirit may not survive when it is too strongly at ·odds 
with self-interest. Observation and experimentation 
should make it clearer which conditions are likely to 
generate each of these patterns . . .  (xii) 
The question for the reforestation work-process is whether 
optimality is more closely approached by less-than-perfect 
dominance by an owner or by less-than-perfect reliance on a 
I 
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democratic work team. The cooperative crews generally 
worked better than the contract crews, especially on the 
problem of undetectable shirking. Perhaps natural 
sociality is the explanation, and a main source of the 
cooperatives' advantage. 9 If so, it is important not to 
eschew the benefits of such an advantage in institutional 
design. The cooperative crews always talked of a "public 
interest, " but, unlike the Rothschild-Whitt collectives 
individual self-interest was recognized, and acknowledged 
as primary by most survivors. The mix of individual and 
group interests in the reforestation cooperatives better 
resembles Mansbridge' s more realistic conceptions. 
As stated, cooperative crews gained a windfall 
advantage as landowners went to per-acre contracts. An 
even larger advantage was delivered a bit later as some 
ilarge · landowners, particularly the U. S. Forest Service, 
came to demand quality in place of quantity. In the early 
1970s , a few years following the first large-scale 
commercial reforestation efforts, silviculturalists had 
\ 
observed numerous plantation failures and had made progress 
in understanding conditions of seedling survival. It was 
9This is an application of the provocative notion 
of "natural sociality, " not a demonstration of it. See 
Dawes, van de Kragt and Orbell -;· (1990), and other essays in 
Mansbridge (1990). 
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also recognized, as timber values appreciated, that 
plantation failure was hugely expensive, first in that 
several years of valuable growth could be lost, and second 
in that the entire site could be lost to brush and become 
prohibitively costly to rehabilitate if tree seedlings were 
not established on the first effort. Also, overdense 
planting of the early years sometimes created deleterious 
seedling competition and increased future thinning costs. 
And, as it turned out, tree seedlings · were quite delicate 
and required gentler handling, better clearing, and 
improved root placement. Contracts were rewritten so as to 
impose harsh pay penalties for failure to meet new - quality 
requirements; to satisfy quality requirements meant a half 
to a third as much quantity production per day. The new 
attention to long-term seedling survival also resulted in a 
startling new variability among contracts. The days of 
"stuff and stomp" were ending. 
The greater quality requirements made the 
cooperative advantage of social supervision even more 
salient. The harshest new quality requirement was emphasis 
on straight placement of the roots, an operation which a 
foreman could observe only of a single individual at a 
time, among his other duties, raising supervision costs, 
and increasing the opportunity for quality shirking. Nor 
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was root placement amenable to social supervision, 
intensifying the collective dilemma. Poor performance on 
this one costly-to-meter requirement could lead to drastic 
pay loss and expensive rework. 10 The temptation to save 
greatly on individual effort in the invisible act of root 
placement is high � Cooperative crews developed strong 
norms against "j-rooting, " a daily problem, but one which 
the cooperative structure was probably more successful in 
handling. 
Cooperative crews, because they based their pay on 
· proceeds from the particular contract, were also highly 
· attuned to variability in contract specifications, and 
became adept at changing worJc routines; while contractors 
typically maintained one pay formula, one routine, with no 
pecuniary incentives for the crew to adapt to variable 
contract specifications. The development of these changes 
in the contracts of a large and growing portion of the 
reforestation market coincided with the birth and growth of 
the first reforestation cooperatives from 1970 to 1976; and 
the cooperatives, in retrospect, prospered from and 
preferred per-acre and high-quality contracts where their 
10Russell (1985a) finds costly metering a common 
trait of the work of spontaneously-formed cooperatives, but 
this was only a minor factor in the early development of 
the reforestation cooperatives. 
{ · " . 
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natural advantage was strongest. Cultural preference, pay 
reliability, easy firm entry, and fortuitous exploitation 
of changes in larger market incentives help explain the 
spontaneous emergence of the first reforestation 
cooperatives . 
Federation of Work Teams ,_: / 
The Hoedads, until 1984 the largest and leading 
firm of this cooperative cluster, began as a partnership of 
three experienced planters in 1970. Its first contract was 
miserable, although later sporadic subcontracting from 
contractors led to the formation of a core encouraged by 
occasional good pay, a few direct contracts, and then the 
addition of experienced planters in 1971. In 1972 and 1973 
the group grew to a dozen or two, operating in an even more 
informal fashion than the typical contractor of the day, if 
that was possible. The group paid piece-rate or share, 
experimentally, the important point being that the group 
decided on the pay system. Organization was haphazard to 
nonexistent, but small-group social incentives and 
charismatic leadership made it work, and pay, although very 
late, was good and did not disappear. The successful group 
began to attract potential entrants, but experience had 
already taught that coordination fails on larger crews; 
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volunteer administration was inefficient; and, the group 
was limited in its ability to win a steady volume of work 
because it lacked the assets to win underwriting of the 
performance bonds increasingly required by landowners for 
any but the smallest jobs. So, in the summer of 1973 
several of the leaders decided on a bold but vague plan for 
expansion. The impetus was pragmatic for some, gaining 
economies of scale, stability, and· market power; idealistic 
for others, expanding alternative organization or building 
a poli,tical base. Discussions were held with two other 
minor partnerships, and a federation of work teams 
proposed. 
In the early Fall, amidst high local unemployment, 
a job advertisement was placed in the local countercultural 
newspaper, and respondents encouraged to attend training 
sessions at a rural site. One did not join the larger 
organization, but had to sign up with a crew. Nine groups 
formed out of the process, and were sent out to the first 
Fall work into utter confusion. Natural selection was 
rampant in that only individuals and groups who rapidly 
solved the problems of camp life, hard work, and crew 
coordination survived. Many individuals selected out, and 
seven groups went on, forging an on-the-fly partnership 
agreement on November 23 and scraping up enough pledges of 
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meager individual assets to justify performance-bond 
underwriting, barely . Deep Winter of 1974 brought further 
work, further chaos, further selection, and further group 
extinctions or mergers. This also happened to be the year 
of the first oil shock, when long gas lines and strenuous 
finagling for fuel made it seem as if civilization was 
coming to an end. Hard labor, hard living, no pay, and 
dreadful organizational confusion led surviving crews to 
resent the founders (who were of course more democratic 
than it seemed to newcomers at the time) and the more 
organized and rebellious new crews led in devising a 
cooperative constitution ratified on February 2 1, 1974. 
Those who lasted the long season enjoyed high-pay Spring 
work and after long frustration were finally rewarded by 
their greatly delayed pay . Then, feelings of. solidarity 
were immense, and individual identification with both crew 
and cooperative overwhelmingly strong. The anomalous 
successes of the cooperative form in a capitalist 
environment is sometimes explained by member self-selection 
( Elster and Moene 1989). In the case of the emergence of 
the reforestation cooperatives, strong selection pressures 
operated, but not so much for individual traits of 
cooperation, as from the peculiar mixture of difficulty and 
casualness in the work itself . 
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In that formative season, the founding crew of 
experienced workers paid themselves by the share, and so, 
initially, did new crews. More successful new crews, 
generally made up of a minority of experienced workers and 
a majority of inexperienced workers shifted to piece-rate 
pay over the season, in order to keep from losing their 
direly needed experienced members to co�tractor crews. 
Piece-rate pay eliminates burdensome collective supervision 
over quantity production, and permits workers to choose 
their own pace or select out if their production is low. 11 
Developing cooperation, social incentives, and norms 
regulating . quality performance allowed for piece-rate 
quantity incentives without the perverse consequence of 
quality shirking that contractors suffered. Piece-rate 
became the norm on most crews, but well-experienced and 
cohesive crews over the years would sometimes choose to 
work by the share with better results. If talent is 
roughly equal and the individuals know and trust one 
another, paying by the share gets better 
production-per-effort results because the last 
externalities of the piece-rate system are internalized. 
But such conditions of equality and trust are precarious. 
11The quick shift from share to piece-rate systems 
recalls Mill' s similar observations of the utopian-founded 
cooperatives in France of the 1850s. 
10 3 
The success of the Hoedads ' new constitution lay in 
its recognition of individual, crew, and cooperative goals. 
Here is the first and lasting statement of purpose. 
The Hoedads is a cooperative organized to provide 
economic sustenance to its members by executing 
contract labor j obs and any other lawful activity 
agreed upon by the membership. (Hartzell 1987, 186) 
Contrary to the several small and sputtering social change 
collectives in the vicinity, the Hoedads ' collective goal 
was the individual welfare of its members. The new 
cooperative was a federation of autonomous work crews, each 
of which controlled its own membership, method of work, 
division of labor, and pay system. This preserved the 
advantages of small-group cooperation, which were proven 
over and over again by the disasters which occurred 
whenever foolish choice or the force of events led the 
cooperative to work large numbers of people together on the 
same site. Each crew sent a representative to a federal 
council, which met weekly, and was charged with ultimate 
responsibility for administration, central budget, and work 
acquisition and allocation. This was supplemented by the 
direct democracy of at least one general membership meeting 
every year. Officers, elected by the general membership 
and supervised by the representative council, were 
responsible for daily administration of central affairs. 
The early cooperative had suffered from unpaid 
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administration, and a major demand of the new crews was for 
an office and a telephone, to begin with. The bylaws 
permitted the council to dedicate a percentage of gross 
proceeds to pay for central administration, and to direct 
the dedication of up to eight percent of each individual' s 
revenues to a "cash reserve fund, " to satisfy the 
prescribed individual membership fee. This capital 
contribution was refundable to the individual within one 
year of resignation, and was used to increase bonding power 
and to finance timely pay for work completed. Members had 
heard of the degeneration of the plywood cooperatives, 
through the hiring of nonmembers, and so established the \._, 
rule that all workers were members, each with one vote. 
The new constitution was ratified with little final 
controversy and almost unanimously. The ratification was 
unanimous in another sense, in that only those who survived 
the harsh formative phase were around to endorse it. The 
general assembly and the council were to operate by 
majority rule. The semi-autonomous crews usually operated 
by majority rule, although with small-group attention to 
strong minorities, and informal tradeoffs from meeting to 
meeting. Crew democracy was mostly informal. The crew 
rode together in the crummy every day with plenty of time 
to talk over problems or triumphs, could communicate all 
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day on the job, and often camped together as well. Formal 
meetings were reserved. for matters that could not be 
settled spontaneously, such as changing the pay system, 
chastising intractable members, extracting and recording 
f.uture work commitments, voting on cooperative-wide issues, 
and so on. There were plenty of crew and cooperative 
meetings, much more so in the beginning, but after years of 
experience older members came to prefer fewer meetings and 
could be quite swift and orderly in dispatching busines$. 
It was recognized that a reasonable person has more 
important things to do in life than attend meetings. 
Greater experience and trust also created a greater 
preference for delegation of decisions. Through sheer 
learning, experienced groups and esteemed leaders could 
manage to become both efficient and democratic. 
In the later 1970s, some new members imported a 
belief popular on the liberal-left, that democracy requires 
consensus. 12 Consensus groups could function, but were 
unstable and usually the first to fail. There are several 
problems. Those with the least to do elsewhere in life 
have the greatest power in the interminable consensus 
process. Trust, ironically, is absent, in that no 
l2I recall one meeting where a crew solved the 
matter by consensually deciding that it would in the future 
work by majority rule. 
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delegation of decision is permitted. The thought of a 
meeting then becomes so horrifying that a larger and larger 
scope of decisions is left to informal leadership and 
clandestine process, an undemocratic outcome. Consensus is 
always biased to the status quo, but problems usually 
originate in the status quo; rapid external change worsens 
the conservative bias. Further, consensus invades the 
individual personality and demands conformity; dissenters 
may acquiesce but in doing so are implicitly judged to have 
compromised the moral ideal. The healthy legitimacy of 
openly holding different views becomes suspect. Finally, 
rational unanimity is impossible for a large class of 
goals. Just to illustrate with a trivial example, suppose 
it is time to decide where the crew works this Spring. Six 
people want to work in Montana because they have friends 
there. Two people want to work in California because they 
have friends there. Three people don't care. Under 
majority rule, the crew goes to Montana, and those in the 
minority might feel they are owed a little deference in 
some future decision (known to political science as 
"logrolling"). Under consensus, the different sides are 
denied the legitimacy of their individual interests, 
because there is only one rational goal for the group, 
which one side or another must adopt, or the group disband. 
Under maj ority rule one is subordinate to shifting 
impersonal majorities, but under consensus one is 





TRIUMPH AND FALL 
Middle Market and Environment 
Green Side Up and Marmot were two partnerships 
which independently stabilized as workers' cooperatives 
similar to Hoedads, and succeeded under the new market 
incentives explored above. Green Side Up chose mostly to 
work around its rural home in southern Oregon, and did not 
develop a federal crew structure. Marmot, in Seattle, 
chose consciously to remain one crew, was mobile, and 
committed to full-time work. In 1976, the three 
cooperatives formed a letterhead organization, the 
Northwest Forest Workers Association, which 9radually added 
a few similar small enterprises discovered elsewhere in the 
region and held annual conferences. 
Also in 1976, an associat�on of reforestation 
contractors formed, whose primary concern and activity was 
the threat posed by the growth of worker cooperatives . The 
contractors believed that the cooperatives were taking away 
their workers, their contracts, and were inflating wages. 
One of their documents (in 1979) was a chart showing 
dramatic annual wage growth, linked to the growth of the 
\· . 
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cooperatives. This material was distributed to forest 
landowners, with the argument that the cooperatives would 
soon monopolize the business and further inflate wages, 
unless they were stopped. This association spent the next 
six years hounding, harassing, suing, and defaming the 
Hoedads. 1 The Hoedads had originally formed as and always 
operated like a partnership, meaning it was subject to tax 
and labor laws in the same manner as business partners. 
The contractors' association argued that Hoedads' members 
were employees and thus faced huge technical liabilities 
under various tax and labor laws (Hoedads' policy was 
always to comply with the law). The contractors launched 
an accusation campaign with every conceivable federal and 
state politician and agency and among private landowners. 
In February, 1977, the cooperative was hit with notice of a 
dozen or so regulatory investigations, the trailing 
consequences of which, along with numerous other legal 
uncertainties attendant to the workers' cooperative form , 
came to consume all its surplus managerial talent from then 
through 1982. 
Hoedads members were reluctant to become subject to 
wage, workers' compensation, and unemployment laws, and 
, 1The Hoedads broqght a defamation action, which, 
delayed to 1982, eventually was settled out of court for 





employee-tax treatment, because many knew from personal 
experience that contractors evaded such requirements by 
cash under the table and double books. Because of their \ 
open nature, cooperatives can avoid, but not evade. The 
self-serving nature of the contractors' claims of 
impropriety was demonstrated in the careful rule they 
devised to define membership in their association: m�mbers 
must be subject to employment laws (not that members must 
comply with such laws). Many of Hoedads' members took 
great pride in their self-employed status. Employee 
subjectivity was estimated to be a net long-term benefit, 
due to the boon of seasonal workers becoming eligible for 
Oregon' s generous unemployment-insurance system . The 
cooperative • s  position was self-serving in preferring 
certain immediate cash to uncertain deferred benefits, and 
short-sighted in underestimating the obvious legal, 
liability and political burden -0f resisting the 
contractors' campaign. Indeed, many of the more 
experienced and long-term members wanted to concede the 
question, but were outnumbered by newer and younger 
members. 
In 1975, an insurgent slate captured cooperative 
offices from founding members, with little tension. 
Organizational experience and some administrative 
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sophistication developed. In 1976, the cooperative, by 
then 300 members, doubled its gross income over the 
previous year, to the considerable satisfaction of members. 
It also helped elect one of its founders to a 
highly-visible post on the local Board of County 
Commissioners. By 1977 the cooperative contained 350 
members in 15 crews. This was thought large enough, 
because it felt a little beyond the natural limit for 
coordination; and also because the cooperative was 
approaching an artificial limit on size imposed by the fact 
that all. its federal contracts were small-business 
set-asides, with a specific limit on gross receipts which 
the cooperative was approaching. The cash-reserve fund, or 
internal capital accounts, reached a substantial level. 
Work supply increased every year, reaching a peak in 1978, 
but remaining high in 1979 and 1980. Wage returns 
increased every year, and by 1980 top cooperative forest 
workers were hitting $25 an hour and $25 , 000 a year and 
more (in 1980 dollars). 
In the later 1970s, the U. S .  Forest Service and 
other forest landowners cut back on planting in the Fall 
season. This was because of reduced seedling survival on 
many types of sites, attributed to planting in the Fall 
rather than the Winter and Spring. So, what had been a 
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fairly steady nine-month tree planting season became a six­
month planting season. This was considered a major impact 
at the time. Those wanting steadier work had to diversify 
their skills or exit the occupation. The change increased 
the distance between more skilled and resourceful members 
and the more casual members. 
In retrospect, several of the rules and routines 
established in Hoedads' formative period proved unstable. 
Turnover in reforestation is high, because of the punishing 
difficulty of the work and the concomitant youth of the 
workforce. For a good contractor it is roughly a 100 
percent a year, for a bad contractor 300 or 400 percent. 
Hoedads' turnover was around 50 percent a year, at worst, 
so always a majority had less than two years' membership 
experience. The rule that every worker is immediately a 
member meant that someone with a one-week commitment had 
the same vote as someone with a five-year commitment; those 
with initial or short-_term commitments would vote for 
policies maximizing return in the short-term and were often 
a majority. This problem became obvious shortly after 
formation, but could not be escaped, because any proposal 
to reduce the influence of short-term members could be 
defeated by short-term members. Conversely, those with 
long-term interests would fail in enacting long-range 
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policies, and, thwarted, would tend to exit the 
cooperative, frustrating accumulation of a long-term 
majority. Such a trap can only be avoided in the 
constitutional phase, through some quite reasonable 
provision such as one year' s probation before admission to 
membership. 
Perhaps through the sheer pressures of operational 
need, the Hoedads were more friendly to centralized and 
specialized administrative roles than their countercultural 
peers. With so many members there was always an abundance 
of raw managerial talent able to take the central reins. 
The trauma of formation built sentiment for sound 
administration, but at the same time, to break the 
overfeared monopoly of the founders�  annual rotation of 
office was established as the formal and informal rule. 
The substantial fear of bureaucracy was rational in so far 
as it kept political parasites from staying warm and dry at 
the office trough, but failed in the long run. The 
youthful members improperly extrapolated from their work in 
the woods, where substitutability of personnel was high, to 
the content of the cooperative' s managerial offices. 
Talent aside, it takes anyone a few months to learn a new 
position, and the minimal function of administrative work 
is as a cheap reservoir of tacit knowledge. Good 
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management' s avoidance of error is invisible, while tiny 
errors can have huge costs. Conversely, Hoedads' 
administration was . based on an annual percentage rakeoff, 
giving office workers a constant incentive to oppose 
operational reductions, even when .called for (it was 
politically easier to run wrongly too large than to 
increase the percentage take). 
Hoedads' managers made roughly the same ann�al pay 
as good tree planters, but had to work two or three times 
as many days out of the year. 2 Managerial undervaluation 
encouraged exhausted voluntary exit from positions after a 
year' s service. Good managers would have been retained if 
they could make as much in the office as they could in the 
field. Such arguments, conveyed by nearly every departing 
inhabitant of the managerial roles, were almost successful 
in establishing mo�e effective tenures, but the initial 
precedent of undervaluation tilted the outcome. Also, 
rotation worked well enough in the many years of market 
growth, through 1980; management errors during subsequent 
market decline were disastrously irreversible. Success is 
a tightrope. 
2r could have been reelected as President of 
Hoedads in 1977, breaking the routine of rotation, but 
withdrew at the last minute because the work was too hard 
for the money. 
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The Hoedads had properly structured their capital 
system so that the perversities of collective capital would 
be avoided. Capital was individually contributed and 
attributed, and refunded within one year of resignation. 3 
But a new perversity appeared, that would have better been 
avoided in the constitutional . phase. Formally, if all 
members resigned, the cooperative would have to distribute 
all its capital within one year. Although the large cash 
reserves were impressive to bankers and bonders, they also 
noticed the one-year capital horizon, and so did Hoedad 
- financial planners, and eventually the membership . 
Investment in real assets that would be required for new 
lines . of work was limited by the high liquidity requirement 
imposed by the cooperative' s bylaws. Allowing up to five 
years for the cooperative to refund capital contributions 
would have made the debt sufficiently long-term to serve as 
equity, and also would permit orderly productive 
investment . When bank-suggested proposals to extend the 
refund period a year or two were informally and formally 
defeated in the .later 1970s, the events revealed the true 
time horizon (or at least short-sightedness) of a majority 
of the membership to any more committed minorities. 
3Mondragon also permits rapid refund of individual 
capital, which Gui (1984) noted as a possible dissolution 
hazard it would be better to avoid through delayed refund. 
�-
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The crew structure worke� very well for operations. 
Crews were represented on the general council for general 
policy, and on a subsidiary bidding council for work 
acquisition and allocation . Crews were precornmitted to 
work when possible, and otherwise subject to complex 
allocation schemes. There was always a problem in keeping 
individuals and crews from shifting from poor-paying jobs 
to well-paying jobs, but promises and equity deliberations 
usually worked to solve it. The crew system was healthily 
competitive in the beginning. Good crews, where 
production, or cooperation, or both, were high, would 
attract productive or cooperative (the two qualities do not 
predictably coincide) workers from other crews . In the 
long run, this self-selection resulted in a range of crew 
quality far greater than random sorting. Whether this was 
a net aggregate loss or gain is difficult to determine. 
Good crews were very good, and bad crews were very bad. 
Bad crews then became a drain on the cooperative as a 
whole, which as a whole lacked authority to rectify the 
situation. Good crews then felt they were subsidizing the . 
bad, for example, in being called in to rescue a failing 
contract. The crew system did not build cooperative-wide 
loyalty, which diminished as members from the formative 
season drifted away. 
\· '" ' 
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It was a slight shock in 1978 when one of the 
founding members, president of the cooperative during the 
contractors' attack of 1977, split off with many of the 
remaining founding members and other older and more 
productive workers to form a new cooperative known . as 
Second Growth. The new cooperative would be launched on 
refund of those individuals' substantial capital accounts, 
due within one year of notice. But since capital reserves 
were high and Hoedads too large, conc�rn turned into 
congratulations. Second Growth selectively recruited 
productive new members from contractor crews. The 
remainder of the crew it left behind in the Hoedads later 
fell apart, leaving the cooperative with undone work and 
unbacked debt. The members of Second Growth were on 
average significantly older and more experienced than 
members of Hoedads. 
This happened again in 1979, as the Mudsharks, a 
very good crew , exited to form its own cooperative. 
Several more clusters of productive and committed members 
publicly or quietly split off from 1979 to 1982 to form 
temporary or permanent enterprises in the initially booming 
market. The departures were not too worrisome, because the 
Hoedads remained large in members and capital. Indeed, 
Hoedads took on a crew from rural Douglas County, with the 
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altruistic aim of helping get them established as an 
independent competitor. But overall the virtual 
costlessness of exit allowed above-average members to 
substitute market relations for democratic relations so as 
to capture greater short-run returns, but in the process 
creating vulnerably small institutions. 4 Such firms 
enjoyed immediate net gains, at the costs of economies of 
scale, especially in work scheduling. The perverse 
self-selection left the Hoedads with comparatively less 
qualified and committed members, not noticed at the outset 
because of the momentum of earlier success, but invisibly 
growing on positive feedback. Furthermore, Hoedads bore as 
a public good the heavy managerial and financial costs of 
the contractors' sustained legal and political assault. By 
1980, some sixteen cooperatives were apparent, many rather 
flimsy, most of them spinoffs from the Hoedads. The 
Northwest Forest Workers Association was then funded and 
staffed to spread the costs of cooperative defense and 
promotion ; although Hoedads paid the largest dues . 
Late Market and Environment 
The supply of reforestation work grew annually from 
4some theoretical economic analysis suggests that 
cooperatives should heighten exit costs. One way is 
through delay of the member' s capital refund. 
-. \ 
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its beginnings in the late 1960s to a peak in 1978. There 
is room for everyone in an expanding market. The market 
power of the cooperatives in Oregon exerted a steady upward 
wage pressure, which ,attracted new workers to the 
cooperatives and to the contractors. The contractors had 
an edge with private landowners (because cooperatives 
publicly contested some forestry practices affecting 
occupational safety and health, and because of 
indemnification of landowner liability through nominal 
workers' compensation coverage of contractors), and a 
number of large operations succeeded, each running a few to 
a dozen crews. Changes in the production process, 
increasing wages due to expanding work supply, and 
competition from the worker-oriented cooperatives, selected 
for contractors who were more reliable in pay and 
operations, more sophisticated in supervision, recruitment, 
and retention, and more flexible as to pay systems (moving 
towards per-hour pay with levels). These contractor 
adaptations reduced, but did not entirely eliminate, the 
natural cooperative advantage. Also, because of entry 
ease � a plethora of shifty small outfits remained, here 
today, gone tomorrow. 
There had also always been a few operators, 
veterans of the Bracero "temporary" farmworker program 
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which up to 1965 had imported a few hundred Mexicans for 
agricultural work around Medford, Oregon , who worked crews 
of smuggled illegal aliens in agriculture and at the 
margins of forestry (Eugene, Oregon, was until 1982 the 
regional center of reforestation, Medford is south on I-5 
near the California border). In the moral climate of the 
early 1970s such practice was generally considered 
illegitimate. In 1974, one of these operators was sent to 
federal prison on charges arising from exploitation of 
illegal aliens on a federal reforestation contract, which 
had a certain deterrent effect (United State� v. Gonzalez 
1974). In 1978, a related operator was under concerted 
federal enforcement scrutiny, but the key witness was 
murdered with a chainsaw and buried in the woods ("A crew 
of seven treeplanters went into the mountains and only six 
/ 
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came down, " Baker 1979, 26) and the investigation was later 
unaccountably ended by the Carter administration. 5 A third 
1 
related party became quite large and notorious in 
reforestation, his outrageous success and wealth creating a 
_ precedent and example for others to follow in the 1980s. 
Sojourning illegal Mexican aliens became 
increasingly common and then dominant in Oregon agriculture 
5Personal interview with cognizant and freshly 
retired Department of Justice investigator, Washington, 
o . c . , 1989. The contractor was represented by the Mexican­
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund . 
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through the 1970s. Woodburn, Oregon, between Eugene and 
Portland to the north, became the center for such activity, 
where wintering-over workers would seek out reforestation 
work from contractors as unreliable, but less abusive and 
ambitious than the Medford group of smuggling contractors. 
In 1978, as part of a much larger national and 
international project, the National Immigration Project of 
the National Lawyers Guild established an immigration 
defense office in Woodburn. These activists proselytized 
the reforestation cooperatives and various local cadre 
organizations, who all adopted resolutions "in defense of 
the undocumented worker. " In the boom year of 1978, 
contractors knowingly importing and employing illegal 
aliens in reforestation became obvious, and cooperatives 
felt natural solidarity in detesting the harsh exploitation 
of such employers. 
Wages were the best ever in 1979, even as a 
regional recession began, stemming from a major downturn in 
the dominant timber industry. In 1980, the regional 
economy collapsed, and Eugene and surrounding southwest 
Oregon were particularly hard-hit. Eugene (a Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area) had an unemployment rate of 
nine percent even after five percent of its population 
moved out that year, indicating the extraordinarily high 
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level of economic distress. Because reforestation follows 
harvest by one or two years, reforestation work supply was 
only barely down, but the general labor supply was up and 
the general wage level down. Reforestation work and wages 
became tight, but the situation was not initially 
disastrous, because of the nonsubstitutability of untrained 
local labor in the strenuous occupation. 
Later in 1980, President Carter directed the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and other federal 
enforcement agencies to refrain from disturbing knowing 
employers of illegal aliens, for purposes of the Census. 
That sector of contractors in reforestation then went from 
marginal and growing to bold and dominant, in only a few 
months. These employers, in actuality a handful of 
interrelated criminal enterprises, were immune to market 
conditions. Even as local reforestation wage levels fell 
by half and more over the next three years, these 
contractors imported or knowingly hired illegal aliens at 
wages one-fourth to one-tenth local standard, thus 
vitiating any productivity advantage that experienced and 
organized workers would otherwise retain. These 
contractors were also generally immune to civil and 
criminal regulation, because of a disturbing lack of 
forthcoming witnesses to their violations, and because 
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their hyperprofits permitted the purchase of political, 
professional and informal protections. Thus, they enjoyed 
the added advantage of being practically exempt from tax, 
labor and social-insurance laws, and their bids showed it. 
By the Fall of 1980, upon the start of the new 
season, the phenomenon had attracted thorough journalistic 
notice and editorial denunciations in the region, not to 
mention panic among local tree planters and contractors. A 
de�onstration of 300 workers was held at the federal 
cqurthouse in Eugene, although without the formal 
p�rticipation of cooperative reforestation workers, whose 
leaders were too influenced by the organized left to admit 
that more than ignorant xenophobia was at issue. The 
gangster problem worsened through 1981 and 1982 to the 
point of utter despair, when collapse of international oil 
prices sent the Mexican standard of living into a tailspin, 
and new millions came surging north on their own. A harsh 
national recession further burdened the labor market in 
1982 and 1983. There was vigorous collusion in the new 
situation by landowners and some federal agencies delighted 
by their fantastic savings in the new era. In 1982, the 
largest landowner, the U. S. Forest Service (FS) reported to 
the House Appropriations Committee that, 
the FS in recent years has generally met or exceeded 




accomplished by . . .  the adoption of sound business 
practices, such as taking advantage of the present 
depressed labor. market. (U. S. Congress, House, 
Committee on Appropriations, 1982, 735) 
"Depressed" was a euphemism. In 1983 (with David Stockman 
heading the Office of Management and Budget) the Forest 
Service returned $80 million of unspent reforestation funds 
to the Treasury. 
Backlog work was cancelled, while "current" work 
was based on the nil harvests of 1980, 1981 and 1982, so by 
1983 the supply of work had dropped by half from 1980. In 
the shakeout, the gangster operations easily held ground 
and even thrived, while legal contractors and cooperatives 
fought over the scraps. By 1984 all but a handful of the 
surviving mainstream contractors went to Mexican crews, 
V 
;, .. 
much of them supplied on a peonage basis through the 
Medford smuggling network. 6 The composition of the state 
reforestation workforce had gone from ninety percent U. S. 
resident in 1979 to thirty percent U. S. resident in 1984, 
amidst persistent local economic depression. This recalls 
6workers "cost" the employer about $500. 
Interestingly, smugglers charge twice as much for 
monolingual Mixtec Indians, because they are more powerless 
than Spanish-speaking . illegals, and so worth more to the 
employer. This observation is independently confirmed in 
Browning (1990). Such economic valuation of powerlessness, 
and the accompanying failure to specify the employment 
contract, challenge the assumptions of the economic theory 
of the firm. 
/ , ' 
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Mill' s prediction that where more workers joined 
cooperatives, capitalists would gradually be induced to 
abandon control, with the twist that capital instead 
imported numerous extranationals to replace the cooperating 
local workers. 
The members of the reforestation cooperatives held 
a wide range of political opinions. Overall, the 
memberships were countercultural and vaguely leftist. A 
disciplined Marxist-Leninist group was active among the 
leadership of the dominant Hoedads, but did not wholly 
control the organization. This was not much of a problem 
until 1980, when the issue of competitors exploiting 
illegal aliens came to the fore . The communists' line, 
liriked to priority . national and international campaigns, 
was that illegal aliens do n6t displace local workers or 
depress wages, even as this was a painful daily reality to 
• . the· workaday tree planter. 
The cooperatives enjoyed considerable local 
political power, and could have undertaken an effective 
campaign against the abuses, but practical steps were 
blocked by the communists, whose goal was to neutralize the 
cooperatives on the question. They publicly suggested, for 
example, only wage enforcement against exploiting 
contractors, which was impossible because of the lack of 
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willing witnesses. Privatelyi the Willamette Valley 
Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild opposed 
enforcing wage and hour laws, because if effective that 
would "keep undocumented workers from getting jobs. " 
Except for a lingering presence, the hard left abandoned 
the Hoedads to its fate in 1982. 
From late 1983 to late 1986, the league of 
cooperatives, Northwest Forest Workers Association, came to 
focus entirely on industry standards in place of 
cooperative promotion, and undertook increasingly 
aggressive actions against unscrupulous contractors, but by 
then it was too late to dislodge the criminal enterprises. 
Some details are reported in Mackie (1986). In January, {' 
I . 
1985, the same contractor who had been sent to federal 
prison in 1974 for labor crimes on reforestation contracts 
reappeared and won half the early federal work in Western 
Oregon. This contractor had a continuing record of violent 
criminal and labor law convictions and judgments stretching 
into 1984, but without credible explanation the federal 
land management agencies and the u . s �  Small Business 
Administration rejected proper and valid formal protests (a 
normal procedure defined by federal contracting 
regulations) of his bids which would have prevailed in any 
impartial tribunal. Something was seriously askew. 7 The 
play-out of this irregular and inexplicable event through 
1985 extinguished the last guttering flame of morale in the 
cooperative movement. The association "suspended" in late 
1986, there being less than a hundred cooperative 
reforestation workers left in the region. Labor market 
conditions did not gain a semblance of normality until 
1988, when the deterrent provisions of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 became effective, and also 
as Oregon' s nine-year recession began to come to an end. 
Meanwhile, the Hoedads began losing grip on its 
legal posture in 1981 and 1982. Although Hoedads' average 
pay probably doubled the minimums required on federal 
contracts by the Service Contract Act (similar to the 
Davis-Bacon Act covering federal c6nstruction c6ntracts), 
the U. S. Department of Labor (which always "lacked 
resources" to pursue the slippery and witness-free 
criminal operations) audited and ordered strict future 
compliance, which meant that the cooperative could no 
longer rely on piece-rate to shape worker self-selection, 
7Federal criminal authorities then warned me to 
guard my life. In 1983, an officer of the U. S. Small 
Business Administration warned us to cease filing protests 
against such contractors on pain of improper retaliation 
against our cooperatives, so we did; and later that year 
the gangster network sent an armed professional enforcer to 
my office with a more comprehensive message. 
128 
but instead had to institute nov�l methods of entry 
control, supervision, and artificial pay subsidizations, to 
universal worker complaint. The Hoedads invented new pay 
systems, but decisions were cursed by cycling (no strong 
majority supported any one pay system, so pay systems 
frequently changed), which introduced uncertainty in 
incentives and pay, one of the faults that the early 
cooperative had formed to avoid. 8 
Next, the cooperative voluntarily subscribed to 
workers' compensation insurance, in order to eliminate the 
uncertain chance of huge premimum liabilities should the 
contractors succeed in pending litigation; the smaller 
cooperatives did not have to make this early defensive 
move. Cooperative members, then and now, consider the 
workers' compensation system in Oregon as infested by 
parasitical formations of lawyers, doctors and bureaucrats, 
and, just as bad, ridiculously prone to abuse by fraudulent 
claimants. For reforestation in the 1980s , a standard 
price was near $35 per $ 100 of payroll, higher when one has 
higher claims. The unscrupulous contractors had little to 
8rn the late 1980s, the Hoedads found a politically 
stable pay system, a pay range (before annual surplus 
distribution) with five grades between $11 an hour and $18 
an hour, where the member chooses her own rate of pay for 
the job. The average of choices is below the nominal 
median. This is constrained by the particular j ob boss 
having authority to refuse to admit the member to the job. 
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no workers' compensation costs ; they subscribed to coverage 
but reported nominal payroll, and injured workers were 
simply abandoned or more benevolently sent back to their 
home villages. The Hoedads made the mistake of granting 
too many dubious claims at the outset. Any determined 
claimant can succeed in beating the system, and as market 
wages continued to dive, individual defectors turned it 
into a retirement program, at the cost to the cooperative 
of huge premium increases in future years. 
The Hoedads had been big and strong for so long 
that most participants and outsiders considered it an 
invulnerable institution, although to the oldest leaders 
and veterans its gathering frailty was apparent. The sense 
of invulnerability was .itself a dangerous weakness. With a 
collapsing marketplace, declining membership quality, and 
sudden and severe changes in the legal environment 
requiring sophisticated adaptations, the crew system and 
the routine. of managerial rotation in Hoedads broke down. 
In 1983, the Hoedads incurred operational losses against 
their capital reserve near ten percent of revenues, 
increasing their handicaps . Only then were long-term 
changes instituted, such as delayed refund of resigning 
members' capital, less frenzied rotation of off�ce, and 
probationary employment of nonmembers, but it was too late 
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to rectify past errors. The crew system was abandoned, and 
from 100 in 1983, the Hoedads' membership fell to 30 in 
1984, although with little reduction in annual receipts, 
illustrating the severity of its organizational problems. 
In February 1986, a member was tragically killed in an 
on-the-job crummy accident, with attendant insurance 
premium increases. The cooperative fell to 15 members, and 
almost dissolved. Even so, the few members later made 
capital investment in a headquarters, and turned happy 
operational surpluses in 1989 and 1990. Hoedads survives • 
in 1990 with a membership of 30. 
In 1982, . as the reforestation market was headed 
into wilder outlawry, all of the cooperatives came into 
unambiguous and strict compliance as subject employees 
under various payroll laws due to the contractors' ea�lier 
harassment campaign; such a posture need not increase 
operating coits, but technical liability and transition 
costs were very heavy. From 1983 to 1985, the smaller 
cooperatives, rurally located with few options for 
diversification, died off as average reforestation prices 
persisted b�low the cost of legal operat�on and below the 
lowest reservation wages even in depression conditions. 
People did not exit the cooperatives for contractor 
employment; they exited forestry, and even the region. 
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Interestingly, although shielded by the limited liability 
of the corporate form, all of the closed cooperatives 
dissolved voluntarily. None went bankrupt or abandoned 
debt. 
The sustained collapse of market supply and of 
legal standards laid bare any hidden weaknesses of the 
reforestation cooperatives. Only the most wicked or the 
most able reforestation firms survived. The cooperatives 
sometimes showed superior business sophistication and 
sometimes short-sightedness and confusion, but these 
qualities are not unique to the cooperative form. The 
adversity was as harsh for the relatively honest 
contractors, who went down by the dozen, even those backed 
by outside investment. The cooperatives did face one 
deadly "disadvantage" in the radically changing labor 
market, inherent to the worker-owned form, the inability to 
replace themselves with oppressed peons. contractors 
could, and did, fire their "American" crews of long 
standing in order to survive in the market. 9 This 
cooperative disadvantage could be an advantage if 
cooperatives existed on a large scale, in softening the 
9one federal "minority" contractor told desperate 
� job applicants in 1984 that it was against company policy 
to hire "Americans. " Elsewhere, citizens of Mexican 
heritage had to represent themselves as illegal aliens in 
order to be hired. 
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assault of wanton market forces on human communities. 
Labor-controlled firms, just as outmoded capital-controlled 
firms, should change or fail as markets change, but they do 
not throw away their members. 
Second Growth: , Unqualified Success 
Second Growth was the cooperative distinguished by 
the greatest average age and work experience of its 
members. There is an atypical problem of mobility in 
forestry. Any avenue of advancement through developing 
skill is blocked by the norms of the forestry profession. 
With Gifford Pinchot' s Forest Service as the main pattern, 
even the large landowners conform to the progressive-era 
rational-bureaucratic model of a scientific elite of 
forestry-school graduates overseeing the utilitarian 
administration of nonpersonal inputs and outputs. The 
segregation is quite acute; forestry-school graduates begin 
at age 22 with more responsibility than noncredentialed 
veterans are ever able to attain, even in the simplest 
matters, except by contract. The aging forestry worker has 
to find alternatives to superathletic treeplanting, and 
they are not easily found in forestry. The problem can be 
solved individually or collectively. 
Secorid Growth initially imitated the informal 
aspects of the Hoedads, indeed exaggerating them in its 
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early years, as it - sought to avoid perceived bureaucratic 
shortcomings of the Hoedads model. Part of that was a 
disinclination for becoming a huge, multi-crew operation, 
although. Second Growth was strong at 50 to 100 members. It 
brought in some good workers from contractor crews. Second 
Growth also agreed to dues which made it the second biggest 
funder of the Northwest Forest Workers Association at its 
first staffing in 1980, addressing the public-good 
complaint of the Hoedads (the other cooperatives largely 
paid nominal dues). As the market collapsed in the early 
1980s, the bulk of Second Growth members had greater 
personal investments in the enterprise than the more 
"political,'' even more social, Hoedads, and because of 
their established urban location, more personal investment 
and work options than the stay-at-home rural cooperatives. 
Niche work, distance work, and alternative work in 
construction were more aggressively probed. 
Perhaps because it was smaller and more stable than 
Hoedads but older as a group than the other smaller 
cooperatives, or perhaps just through various accidents, 
Second Growth became more effectively concerned with 
long-range issues even as the market situation became 
impossibly bleak. It was lucky and meritorious in winning 
an experimental three-year contract of commuting 
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reforestation work from the Eugene Bureau of Land 
Management in 1982. A revolution had been brewing from the 
onset of the downturn in 1980, and in 1983, a majority of 
Second Growth members coalesced to demand professional 
management, probationary membership, greater capital 
commitment, and rapid adaptation to the new legal 
environment. This was accomplished at the troublesome loss 
of one-third of the membership, but also established 
formative renewal. Second Growth was vigilant in avoiding 
fraudulent workers' compensation claims, and became 
fanatical over safety. As the reforestation market 
continued sour in 1984, Second Growth cleverly bid into 
w�ll-funded Mt. St. Helens volcano-eruption replanting, 
successfully diversified into the equally depressed but 
relatively protected local construction market, and bought 
and remodelled a headquarters. Since then, it has done . 
very well in forestry and construction . 
Upon leaving, a Second Growth member receives a 
three-year promissory note for individual capital 
contributions, limited by any external or agreed internal 
claims on the funds. Additionally, the cooperative, for 
complex tax and bond-underwriting reasons, maintains some 
collective capital, but makes it also individually 
recoverable through a negotiation process. Accumulation is 
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to the point in 1990 where each member has a $2, 000 to 
$30, 000 interest in the firm, which has interesting 
motivational effects. With that stake of a loss, 
particular job problems or cooperative-wide problems are of 
strong practical interest to every member, and the more 
diffuse organizational shirkings have become that much more 
self-regulated. It does not seem to be the case, as 
suggested by abstract economic theories of the firm, that 
members are worried that their capital lacks diversified 
placement; quite the contrary, members feel that they would 
own no capital at all save for the cooperative form which 
has rewarded them with it. 
The cooperative employs a good number of 
individuals, but constitutionally requires retained 
employees to become members after a year of work. Among 
the few problems that have resulted are one employee whom 
the cooperative could not tolerate as a member, resulting 
in termination, and one employee who did not want to become 
a member. The forestry arm has so far been successful in 
integrating some recently legalized Mexican-American 
workers, some monolingual, as members. Officers are 
annually elected, but in fact successful officers are 
retained and rewarded; the president and chief is finishing 
an eight-year tenure. The fifty or so cooperative members 
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are making $ 15, 000 to $40, 000 a year (above local norms for 
the work), and full-time officers make as much or more a 
day than field workers. The cooperative is so successful 
that in 1990 it must divide its construction and forestry 
arms so as to satisfy irrelevant but unavoidable 
small-business size limitations. 
Second Growth is clearly more vigorous to the 
observer than its conventional competitors in reforestation 
and construction, both in economic efficiency -and, through 
the cooperative form, in furtherance of additional values. 
Self-selection is not the explanation, because all firms 
select their personnel. Setting aside the several 
suggested structural explanations, their success might be 
due to the simple happenstance of making the right choices 
in difficult situations. These choices were based on the 
ancient virtues of working hard, saving, planning for 
tomorrow, and choosing good leaders. The failed 
cooperatives were victims of circumstances, but the values 
of Second Growth members allowed them to master their fate. 
The ants lived through the winter, but the grasshoppers are 




Intellectual integrity demands that one avoid 
concocting apologetics for cooperative failure, but neither 
should quite ordinary failure be asserted as support for 
theories predicting degeneration. The forest workers' 
cooperative movement failed, but not because of any 
degenerative tendencies inherent to the cooperative form. 
It failed because its main market collapsed, which equally 
extinguished its conventionally-owned competitors. The 
cooperatives may have even showed greater robustness of 
survival when compared with the honest reforestation 
contractors in the impossible situation. 1 A regional 
depression from 1979 to 1987, the sudden collapse of work 
supply by half and wage levels by as much, and invasion by 
a cunning and violent network of gangsters with bottomless 
competitive advantage, eliminated all but a few of the 
legal enterprises, cooperative or privately-owned. At the 
same time, led and paid for by the dishonest contractors, 
conventional enterprises won a disingenuous campaign 
1This impression is supported by State of Oregon 
Bureau of Labor and Industries records on licensing of 
forestry contractors. 
138 
against the cooperatives on the issue of employee-tax 
subjectivity. This stunning ,but temporary burden came just 
as the market and illegality were at the nadir. The 
concatenation of blows was too much. 
The cooperatives were enormously successful in the 
late 1970s, and there was a feeling by 1980 that the 
movement was poised for broad diversification, along the 
lines of Mondragon. But that did not come about. 
The reforestation cooperatives failed to adapt to 
radical market changes. They were ruined by their 
short-sightedness. Is this a quality inherent to the 
cooperative form? Obviously not. The cooperatives 
spontaneously emerged in the first place because of the low 
capital barrier to entering the reforestation business. 
But also the peculiarly athletic nature of reforestation 
meant that the cooperatives' members were very young on 
average, with short time-horizons. Formative structures 
worsened this bias. A normal progression of maturity might 
have resulted in the gradual reaggregation of individual 
preferences into longer collective time-horizons .. Indeed, 
this happened with the most aged grouping in the cluster, 
Second , Growth; which led to arresting success under the 
most unfavorable conditions. It happened with the Hoedads 
too, although some years too late, and with too many 
trailing burdens for confirming reward. 
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The initial conditions which permitted formation 
and early growth of the forestry cooperatives are now 
absent. Reforestation is no longer a new industry, the 
early cooperative advantage as landowners changed contract 
incentives is dissipated, and the surrounding culture is 
indifferent to cooperative ideals. Moreover, the timber 
industry is in terminal decline. The movement cannot be 
reborn. 
It is true that in a modern market economy, with 
its many advantages, that firms must come and go. A major 
fallacy in the evaluation of the viability of workers' 
cooperatives is an obsession with firm failure. The 
question is comparative. Conventional enterprises fail as 
frequently (Ben-Ner 1988b), only without the dramatic 
obituaries. Intrinsic forces of cooperative failure have 
been confidently identified in recent years. The real 
barriers to growth of a cooperative sector, I believe, are 
not arcane transformation dilemmas, but the relative lack 
of capital among workers who might form such enterprises, 
and the lack of cheap information in the form of models to 
imitate. Such barriers could be lowered with minimal 
social and economic intervention. 
The Hoedads and their kin were admired by some 
outsiders not only for their democratic commitment but also 
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for the purity of their allegiance to some of the assumed 
ancillary cooperative ideals. But Futterman is correct to 
insist on a minimal definition of the worker-managed firm : 
The procedure is to call a firm worker-managed when the 
workforce of the firm, in a politically egalitarian and 
democratic manner, has ultimate authority over the 
decisions of the enterprise, including the right to 
delegate some or all decisions to managerial organs. 
This approach will be controversial, for both 
traditional proponents of "work-place democracy, " and 
their detractors, have tended to assume that workers' 
control might mean additional things, such as 
egalitarianism in income distribution, direct democracy 
in decision-making, and anti-specialization within the 
workforce. { Futterman 1984, 17 1) 
The issue is not j ust definitional. Unthinking adherence 
to those "additional things" has doomed many a fledgling 
cooperative. Overcommitment to community can prevent its 
occurrence. 
The reforestation cooperatives thrived to the 
extent that they were practical about such ancillary 
ideals, and languished to the extent that they were 
dogmatic about them. By thoroughly democratic decision, 
the Hoedads generally avoided mechanical egalitarianism of 
income, direct democracy and consensus in all things, and 
anti-specialization. This made them more affluent and 
ongoing than the ephemeral collectives of the day, while 
not sacrificing the ambience of liberation. At the same 
time, the Hoedads may have been so devoted to external 
social, political and environmental causes as to make for 
- .. 
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both the neglect of internal affairs and the accumulation 
of too many powerful enemies. Failure to retain and reward 
managers was in the end more of a real menace than the 
imaginary threat of bureaucratization. 
Hoedads' biggest defect was its practice of 
instantaneous membership, but this was academically 
celebrated as evidence of the cooperative ' s  purity of form. 
It was a defect because it prevented the accumulation and 
enactment of long-term interests and goals. Employment of 
nonmembers can be a sign of cooperative degeneration. But 
it can also be a sign of serious commitment to the 
cooperative community. It is simply unfair to grant 
transient or new and unproven individuals the same voice in 
the enterprise as those who have committed their lives to 
it. Temporary employment or probationary membership can 
build community as well as undermine it. Any realistic 
system of workers' cooperatives would have to permit some 
employment. Imagine an economic system which wholly 
forbade employment at "full employment"  (no one 
involuntarily without a job ) . What would prevent 
opportunistic individuals from flitting from one 
cooperative to another, hijacking collective resources, 
j ust as some of the renowned financiers of today? 
An unsung advantage of workers' cooperatives is 
their practical utopianism. The undeniable urge for 
14 2 
community can be dangerous, but is continually denied under 
the pleasant but atomized and bureaucratic circumstances of 
present-day life. That the urge can be dangerous is shown 
in the totalitarian fevers that have killed hundreds of 
millions and gripped much of the earth in dictatorship. 
Workers' cooperatives are good in rebuilding face-to-face 
community at the primary level of modern association, the 
workplace. If proposals can' t carry one' s workgroup how 
can they be advocated for 250 million people? If twelve 
people won' t vote for mechanical income equality, then how 
can a nation? Conversely, who can imagine a system of 
cooperatives where. the norm is to expel members who need 
four weeks' unpaid leave to care for a new baby? such 
issues are best dealt with on the personal level, if 
possible, where people can be told that they deserve less 
pay or that they deserve time off for their family. The 
transformative value of having to solve democratically 
one' s own local collective problems is as much a social 
benefit as the more vaunted virtues of participation. 
Many of the participants, including myself, feel a 
glaring absence of community on either side of our 
experience in the cooperative movement. Martin Buber 
(1949), then criticizing Leninism, wrote: 
Community should not be made into a principle; it, too, 
should always satisfy a situation rather than an 
14 3 
abstraction. The realization of community, like the 
realization of any idaa, cannot occur once and for all 
time; always it must be the moment' s answer to the 
moment' s question, and nothing more. (134) 
Buber was right, but there is more to it, too. Contrary to 
public choice theory, institutions are more than mechanisms 
for the mere aggregation of individual preferences. 
Institutions form preferences too, as has been commonly 
observed, and one may deliberately choose those 
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